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# JAPAN'S PLACE IN THE WORLD

by  
JULIAN 'GRANDE

*Author of " Geneva's Place in the World "*

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


ON THE ROOF OF THE MANCHOUKUO WAR OFFICE, HSINKING.

*From left: Chief of Staff, Japanese Army, Mr. W. A. Mitchell, Times Correspondent; Commander in Chief, Manchoukuo Army, Mr. Ishihara; the Author; and Ford Ch...*

*Photo by James L. Miller, published in U.S.A.*





*First Printing, 1934*

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## INTRODUCTION

THERE is no lack of books about China and Japan—some wise and some otherwise. The majority of modern narratives, however, deal mostly with chopsticks, the geisha, cherry blossom and the kimono. True, in some of these volumes political, military, diplomatic, social and economic strands have been skilfully interwoven, but the real life of the people gets lost.

The reader will find in this volume a plain pen picture of Japan and her people whose name and fame are now daily the Topic of the world. A clear introduction is also given to the ancient influences still reigning in China, as well as in Manchuria. I have tried to obtain an insight into the lives and aspirations of the mystic peoples of the Far East. It may be because the Japanese people are constitutionally silent, more so even than the Scots, but it is sometimes difficult to



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get an insight into their country and to understand it. Nevertheless, mind often can speak to mind without the use of words. The Japanese have practised that for hundreds of years and are accustomed to understand one another through the inner spirit speaking to the inner spirit. All through I have tried to depict things as I have seen and heard them and have written everything impartially and objectively. I may have been mistaken in some details during my sojourn in the Far East, but on the whole I am satisfied that I have obtained independent data from diplomats and councillors whose interest in Japan was to serve their respective countries. Besides these persons there are unofficial ambassadors in the Far East—the accredited correspondents of some of the great journals of the world, who are often the best informed of all people in regard to the country in which they are living. From these men one can learn a great deal if they feel they can toss their thoughts freely without being misunderstood or misinterpreted, and, above all, if they can trust their guests to be discreet. I am

speaking from personal knowledge and not from information alone. Having been a correspondent abroad, in the various capitals of Europe and the Near and Far East for thirty years, I know very well how difficult it is to work in foreign capitals and in foreign languages.

I should much prefer in a book of this sort to exclude all mention of my own ego or personality or even of my career. I felt, however, that many readers might desire to know my credentials for undertaking such a task. There is further the justification that, by bringing in the ego, the book is presented in a clearer light. I want here to stress the fact that my experience as a British journalist watching British interests abroad for so long a period and in so many countries has confirmed the habit of being impartial in my outlook and judgment.

It was my privilege to act as *The Times* correspondent from 1910 to 1916, and for fifteen years as representative of leading provincial journals, such as the *Birmingham Post* and the *Sheffield Telegraph*. For an equally long period

before and during the War I was correspondent of the *Evening News*, the *Pall Mall Gazette* and the *Observer*, besides contributing to almost every London daily. In addition, I was a contributor to the *Spectator* and other literary journals. From 1915 to after the Armistice I acted as Special War correspondent for the *New York Times*, *New York Evening Post* and certain Dominions papers. Together with my wife, I had, further, during the War, the great advantage of being in charge of the British Government's service in Switzerland for counter-acting enemy propaganda. Throughout the War I contributed the British point of view to twenty-eight Continental newspapers and published about one hundred books and pamphlets, besides editing and publishing monthly illustrated journals in French, German and Italian. My most recent journalistic experience was again in the plotting ground of Europe, for twelve years as staff correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* accredited to the League of Nations. It was in this last capacity that I attended sixty-four meetings of the

Council, fourteen assemblies, all the Disarmament Conferences, Economic Conferences, and the various League Meetings, besides the Locarno Treaty Conference and the Reparation Conference at Lausanne in 1933. I finished my task at Geneva with months and weeks of listening to the debates and discussions on what is now known as the Sino-Japanese conflict.

Nothing has perturbed me so much as the handling of the dispute between China and Japan regarding Manchuria. When, therefore, as a result of the bungling of the League, Japan withdrew from that institution, I immediately left for the Far East to inquire and to see for myself what it all meant. After spending several months in China, Japan, and Manchuria, studying the question impartially and independently, I am satisfied that had the League not meddled in the affair but left it to China and Japan to settle, the two countries would have come to an amicable understanding. This I say after conversations last year with Chinese leaders at Nanking, Chinese professors at Peking, as well as interviews which I

had with the leading elder statesmen in Tokio. Even in Manchuria, at Hsinking (Changchun), Mukden, Chinchu, Jehol, and other places, I heard the same story: "If the League had only left us alone, we should have escaped all the trouble and sufferings." True, many of the Manchurian people honestly believed that the League would order the British Fleet to anchor at Dairen, land bluejackets, oust all the war lords from Manchuria, hang all the bandits and establish an independent Manchurian State with Mr. Henry Pu Yi, present Emperor, as constitutional monarch. Later, however, when the Manchurians realized that the League had no power or control over the British Navy, they thankfully accepted Japanese help, and now they can live in peace and security. I am certain that, if it were possible to transmit the feelings of the thirty million Manchurians to the West, those people who are still of the opinion that Japan ought to have allowed the war lords to terrorize the country would be thankful to Japan for having spilt her blood and spent her money in rescuing these down-trodden people.

Whether or not I have succeeded in my task of describing the social, political and economic life of Japan, I leave my readers to decide. But it is only fair to say that before the manuscript went to print I submitted copies to a number of my friends who for many years have lived in Japan, China and Manchuria, and some of whom still live there. Some of them were in the diplomatic service ; some professors at the universities ; others medical missionaries ; and, finally, there were colleagues of mine stationed in the Far East representing the leading journals in England and the U.S.A. One and all they have assured me that I have not wasted my time in the Far East, but that I have grasped the situation and that, on the whole, I have given a fair and impartial picture of the countries and their peoples. The people from whom I obtained information, quite apart from my own observations, did not belong to one particular nationality. Furthermore, they were representatives of all classes, professions and creeds. All are of the highest integrity and able to form sound judgments. They know the country

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they live in, they understand the people, and they are absolutely independent. To their judgments I have added my own, based on direct evidence.

JULIAN GRANDE.

Authors' Club,

2, Whitehall Court, S.W.1.

*June, 1934.*

# JAPAN'S PLACE IN THE WORLD

## CHAPTER I

### PREJUDICES

THE chief prejudice is the racial one. There is no need to have a conspiracy of silence about it. The Japanese, like the Chinese, does not hide his contempt for the "red-faced barbarian." Open talk, if only it is restrained, is better than dissimulation.

"Eur-Asia" is not a solution, either for persons or peoples, of the difficulties in the relationship between East and West.

Perhaps to call the race-feeling a prejudice is a misuse of words. Let us call the colour touchiness a conviction, with a positive as well as a negative side.

The essential fact, giving the best hope for a working agreement to differ (in colour), is that it



is not the Westerner alone who feels that his tradition is more precious, but that Easterner and Westerner each thinks his own ways and beliefs and civilization more rich, more true and more sensible !

If the Far East, or Japan, once thought Western ways overwhelmingly attractive, this was a phase and is almost past.

By knowledge and pride in the several traditions of each race, the world will gain more than by hysterical ignorant assumptions that " the other man's way is better—or worse."

No man would save his life by accepting the offer to enter another man's skin, if by doing so his own identity were sacrificed. By analogy, the racial prejudice or conviction cannot be willed away.

When we say we " like " another people it may only mean that we do not take that people seriously. Perhaps everybody " liked " Japan before the Russo-Japanese War. The fact that most peoples have come to " like " Japan less and less in this century is the measure of the growing respect for Japan—a respect won by



BLOOMING CHERRY AT KAJIKAWA



arms without, and by a determination to be master within, her own borders.

This hatred or fear, if the above suggestion has any truth, may be reduced to realistic proportions by insistence upon the healthy quality of respect.

However, even extreme insistence upon respect would not completely allay the fear and the resultant hatred, even if the very sources of fear were exposed.

For example, people speak as if the Pacific Ocean were a zone of Japanese naval influence. Foreign residents know the fear, real and stimulated, caused in Japan by the American fleet's visit to Australia, the exercises off Honolulu and the concentration of ships on the Pacific coast of the United States. Less is openly said about British naval measures or naval bases much closer to Japan. But these isolated examples are enough to put into focus the assertion that the Pacific Ocean is a Japanese zone of influence.

Our maps are partly to blame. The use of

globes or of maps showing the real weight of peoples and political forces bordering upon the Pacific Ocean would half cure our fears.

Or again, to narrow our survey to the far eastern parts of Asia, fear *of* Japan may upon reflection resolve itself into positive anxiety *for* Japan.

There are observers who are ever anxious to exaggerate the loss of advantages once held by England as the pioneer industrial country. Do these people ever give a thought to the inevitable loss of much less firmly established advantages at present enjoyed by Japan over China and India ?

If there is any excuse for the present far from disinterested campaign of fear against Japan, there is no excuse for short-sighted lack of sympathy towards Japan in her vastly unequal struggle against time and numbers.

In all the columns of articles poured out with such care-free heresy-hunting, during the Manchurian "incident," how much information was offered to the Western reader ? When Western journalists write opinionative articles about Western affairs,

no serious criticism can be brought against them for failure to enlighten the public. That public has a working knowledge of the probable processes of government in the West, based upon general knowledge. When Western newspapers are dealing with Far Eastern or other unfamiliar affairs their responsibility is of a different kind. Even when the forms and labels in the Far East appear familiar to Western editors, they must still ask themselves the question: "How far is this apparent similarity of form an aid to me, and how far is it a positive will-o'-the-wisp?" Thus China is swallowed smoothly as a "Republic," and Japan is taken to be a "Parliamentary Monarchy," with all that such designations imply to Western minds. But discussion of Chinese and Japanese affairs, and even more of Chinese-Japanese controversies, will only be darkened by such assumptions, if not modified by study and knowledge. Thus, to give only a simple example, the anti-Japanese press of the West for long assumed, quite incorrectly, that the Japanese Army and Navy act exclusively upon Cabinet

instructions. The consequent criticism of the actions of these forces, considered and considering themselves to be the Emperor's Army and Navy, was deeply resented by all Japanese as an insult to the Emperor himself. This and similar chronic ignorance of the spirit in which the Japanese forms of government work was largely responsible for the swift loss of all influence by liberal and anti-war Japanese after hostilities began.

It is the first principle of newspaper work never to assume that the public remembers even from one day to another the details of any news item. Repetition and explanation are unwearied. Yet, throughout this time of extreme responsibility and opportunity, how far did even the greatest papers go to instruct the West upon what it could not remember because it had never known—history, constitutions, characteristics of the Chinese and Japanese peoples?

Beyond diverting and vague references to "elder statesmen," "inscrutability," "the Boy-Emperor," "China-Propor," and like catch-phrases, what reader in the West is any the

wiser, for the sum of all the articles whose aim it should have been to help to form his *own* opinion ?

A German recently asked : “ Dieu, est-il français ? ” It is pertinent to paraphrase this, and to ask : “ Le diable, est-il japonais ? ”

It may be useful to glance at some of the sources of interference. To give them a comprehensive name, they are the old-fashioned voices preaching “ universality ” ; and those who spread the doctrine at present come almost exclusively from the land across the Pacific Ocean which consistently whitewashes and favours China in every Chinese-Japanese controversy. In the phrase of the witty authors of “ 1066 And All That,” they write after every action of China : “ This was a Good Thing,” and after every action of Japan : “ This was a Bad Thing.” These “ Universalists ” have a crude notion that summer round-trips and the excitement of patronizing Orient-viewing give that “ contact ” which, for unknown reasons, is to solve all questions between peoples—with suitable exceptions.



The Japanese have a shrewd suspicion that a certain power's fixed idea in favour of China is not entirely unrelated to Chinese markets.

The greatest danger, just raising its head, is that Trade Union labour in the West may be stampeded into interference with what will be labelled "Slavery in Japan." Reckless charges and mere abuse are already heard. Honest study together with a dispassionate reservation of judgment, born of historical memory and vision, alone can keep such interference within proper bounds. British trade union labour has survived the persecution of the movement in Italy and in Germany; its cry is ever "Hands off Russia," and "No encirclement of the Russian Comrades." In Japan no privileges have been lost, as in the first-named countries. With memories of the 1830's in England, will English trade unionists put hypocrisy aside and show an imaginative sympathy towards the groping unorganized Japanese workers, at most two generations removed from feudalism? What form should long-sighted sympathy take? Let trade union

labour exert an influence in favour of patience towards Japanese labour. Let extreme patience, even an excess of forbearance, be shown, and so counter that discrimination and racial prejudice, the suspicion of which is seldom absent from Japanese thoughts.

It may be fashionable at present to make of Japan a scapegoat, but her ambitions, whether in trade or for territorial expansion or for military power, are neither more nor less to be praised or condemned than the very same ambitions of her detractors.

Just because a people calls itself a republic or a socialist state it does not mean that such a people is less imperialistic than a monarchy or an empire. If the question arises, as between Chinese and Japanese, of which are the greater "infiltrators" in the Pacific zone, any traveller will bear testimony that it is Chinese, not Japanese, who are to be found in greater numbers and exerting greater influence all through mainland and island Malaya as well as in the land of the Manchus ! The history of Korea as of other outlying parts

of the Japanese Empire does not suggest that the Japanese are a settler-colonizing people, however admirable their record as administrators and organizers.

Or again, remembering the geographical and climatic facts about Japan, it is very difficult to be impressed by talk of the desire for settlement in numbers either in the Philippines or North Australia or any other non-temperate zone—not to mention the Brazilian experiment. More study and fewer assertions may ease the suspicions against Japan, at least in the forms usually repeated.

As to trading and commercial trends, the documented and fully authenticated reports of the British Commercial Counsellor at the Embassy in Tokio, as well as the information upon general labour conditions in Japan, and especially in the cotton industry, printed in *The Times*, and by the International Labour Office, present a welcome contrast to the hysterical campaigns let loose for foolish or for knavish purposes.

•

CHAPTER II  
TENDENCIES

ALL the recent criticism lavished upon Japan only exposes the chaos and confusion of present-day political philosophy. The voices of the propagandists and well-meaning peace-lovers (self styled peace-promoters) momentarily shout down those more helpful voices which express ideas rather than aspirations and are founded on memories reaching far back and beyond the war sorrows of our generation limited to one portion of the earth's surface. Foreign residents in Japan are often brought back to reality by the words: "The European War" as applied to what is dangerously called "the World War" by Europeans.

Let Europeans remember, before it is too late, that the issue of a static conception of history as opposed to a dynamic conception has *not* been settled; still less has it been settled in favour of

the static conception. And further, even if the latter has appeared to be accepted temporarily in the European West, the springs of such a temporary movement are unknown to a large part of the non-European West and to a greater part of the East and Far East.

Is European war weariness a political philosophy, and if so, is it a fair one to impose upon Japan? Such "universality" is surely out of date.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that if present-day philosophy tends to move away from a conception of "balance," it has moved not towards a static conception of things, but definitely to a conception of "tension"—under various names. Thus, even on the widest philosophic ground, it would be most unsafe to assume that Japan's national philosophy is opposed to the essential general tendency in world ideas.

Eastern peoples do not persist in fixed estimates of Western nations any more than do the Western nations among themselves. If the groupings and alliances into which European nations, for example

arrange and rearrange themselves are continually changing, no less rapidly does Japan alter her valuations of the Western peoples. War, the issues of wars, may have something to do with this as in the replacement of French officers by German instructors for the Japanese army after the Franco-Prussian War.

In Japan there are passing fashions in nation-fancying, but there is no apparent direct relation between the regard in which any nation is held and the degree in which that nation is imitated, As between Japan and any Western nation. imitation is by no means to be taken as the sincerest form of flattery.

What is quite beyond question is the tendency in Japan to revolt against the indiscriminating Westernization practised by the last two generations. It would be almost wholly mistaken to imagine that this movement is the outcome of recent events. Its sources are deeper, and by no means is it a sudden improvised departure.

Thoughtful Japanese have long since ceased to be dazzled by Western industrial life, even if they

copy it, or to find any virtue in blindness to their own national and racial traditions.

There are those who discern nothing but omens of terror and woe in a movement emotionally labelled "Back to Asia." If, however, the argument outlined here has any truth, the movement may be hoped to hold out a hope for that candour and respect which are the enemies of prejudice, false fear and out-of-date interference.

Again, it may make good head-lines to suggest that a "Back to Asia" movement, for some mysterious reason, threatens even the most out-of-the-way, extra-Asiatic shores. But Japanese thinkers almost undoubtedly are tending to advocate concentration of effort as opposed to the present over-diffused policy. There is no good reason to think that "Back to Asia" means any thing else than back to Asia. It is enough.

To some foreign residents in Japan it would be a welcome clarifying of the true situation if the unchanging Chinese attitude towards the "foreign devil" were more openly adopted by the Japanese.

In Japan the foreigner was made too much of, till recent times. He was welcomed simply as a Westerner, even if a blatant adventurer. Japan often suffered for her anxiety to hob-nob and to enjoy what was often no better than a third-rate Western mannikin parade.

But there still remains the question of what will come of the movement within Asia. Already it has been suggested that the Pacific Ocean is in little danger of becoming exclusively a Japanese zone of naval influence. Likewise, a clear survey of Asia will hardly cause a serious student of affairs to tremble for the vast mainland.


Romantic claims of prowess were almost forced upon Japan after her victory over an outpost of the incredible and feared old Russia. The casualty lists at the Battle of Mukden should restore some sense of proportion. To-day, a Europe obsessed by the slightly "excessive" man-power of Germany, might well have some sympathy to spare for Japan as she faces multiples of her own numbers. Once more, let it be urged, time is no ally of Japan.



To come to the point most closely affecting the West in the meantime, namely, commercial power as used by Japan, it may surely be asserted with some confidence and already with significant proofs, that this threat, lacking all subtlety, is one that must automatically solve itself and is already diminishing.

The concentration upon the war effort by European countries from 1914-18 led to notable advances in the industrial and commercial aggrandisement of America and Japan. Currency influences in the case of Japan further account for artificial export power. When the new levels are reached they may approximate more closely to the old relative levels of 1914.

Already the impolitic policy of inexperienced Osaka has drawn upon itself repercussions. At New Delhi the greatest Asiatic power has irresistibly brought the Japanese Government to use its influence with the Japanese cotton manufacturers. What an awakening for most Japanese to find that Asiatic dumping was as likely to be



PICKING TEA LEAVES, SHIZUOKA



excluded as Lancashire goods! The spear-head has become a boomerang.

Progressively, the suspicion of Japan as the mad-dog of commercial imperialism will be found to yield to similar very quiet methods of conference, no less effective if they can be kept scrupulously free from all taint of revenge or discrimination.

Not only Japan but every nation of the earth is learning at the present time that in an age when machines are common to all, commercial aggression is an exploded dream. In this respect President Roosevelt's Message to Congress is only the acceptance of an inevitable trend, when it admits that even the United States is "seeking the restoration of commerce in ways which will preclude the building up of large favourable trade balances by any one nation at the expense of trade debits on the part of other nations." It is, indeed, a safe prophecy that under present conditions the ability to make trade war is fast disappearing.

If any peoples are at all likely to remain a little longer than others outside this law, they

will be China and India rather than Japan, which will by that time join the chorus against "cheap labour," "dumping" and "trade aggression." At present we do not fear China, and she plays God to Japan's Mammon, but very soon Japan will be out-Mammoned, and people will sigh for the good old days when only Japan had machines and efficient fighting services. For if Asiatic numbers, as has been urged, are against Japan, no more are they in favour of the West.

## CHAPTER III

### A POLICY

ENGLAND stands in a unique relation towards Japan. In the days of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance the situation, on its less pleasant side, was politely obscured. But no kind veil can be relied upon now that the alliance has been sacrificed. Moreover, to this new situation has been added a huge new factor which forces many observers to the conclusion that, far from Japan being the more isolated of the two countries to-day, it is the British Empire which essentially stands most dangerously isolated by envy and resentment. Japan for the moment is being used as a lightning conductor by the blameless, peace-loving, home-keeping nations ; but if the Manchurian incident gave an opportunity for an outburst of resentment against Japan, how much more has Ottawa provided a point of attack for all the world's

traders in these days of diminishing markets and increasing production. The holding of vast territories while irresponsibly failing to occupy them was tolerated fairly willingly before the attempt (whether right or wrong is beside the point) to reserve Empire markets for Empire trade. Whatever the Press of other nations may have disclosed, there can be no doubt about the temper shown by the semi-official Japanese Press. The old Tolerance has gone. So, to the loss of a staunch and tried Ally, there is added Japan's share to the growingly open and universal envy and hostility towards that biggest lightning conductor, the British Empire. Whatever may have been the weightier cause of the non-renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, whether Dominion or American pressure, or both, let the English public ask itself if the danger of being tied to U.S. policy is not fully as menacing as the former allegedly compromising position of England—a renegade white people allied to a nation of another race.

This raises the further question of whether

England dare regard herself politically in terms of exclusively Western thought. What sanity can there be in an Empire facing every ocean, and numbering a quarter of the inhabitants of the world, pretending to be either a white ostrich or a true-blue West Ender? England occupies her unique place, not as between East and West, but in East and West. How trite such a remark sounds, and how little its difficult challenge is grasped. If England's selfish geographical and population interests make a West *versus* East policy impossible and illusory, so her position places upon her by far the heaviest positive responsibility in this century as in others past.

England is no arriviste, profiteer Great Power. England is no new tripper in Asia or upon the Pacific Ocean. Her sense of long-held power should enable her to eschew the fashionable 'weak man's policy of "flatter and slap." Japan is suffering from unbalanced and insincere flattery from some Powers, on the one hand, and from a shrewd suspicion that "slap" results from one justice for the West and another for the Far East.



Because of the aristocratic principle permeating England and Japan, constantly providing a real understanding and trust between the governing and service classes of both peoples, there is every possibility for England and Japan to conduct their agreements and their differences with a minimum of clownish "flattery and slap."

Historically, geographically, socially and as a monarchy, England can best pursue a policy towards Japan too sure of her power to be overbearing, too sure also to fall short of even-handedness or to lower herself to levels of prejudice best called by the ugly name of fear.

Australia, Canada, New Zealand are growing Pacific Powers of our century. It is they perhaps who will develop the Empire's policy towards Japan into something finer than craven ungenerousness. Already there is talk of an Australian delegation to the Far East—wool has mollifying influences—while Canada already exchanges Ministers with Japan. And so events are forcing the Dominions to go forward from a negative to a common-sense live-and-let-live

policy, which may prove that mutual respect is a better working arrangement than a grudging alliance or a question-begging suspicion.

Each Dominion must grapple with white immigration and cease to delude itself with petty issues about Japanese fishermen in British Columbia or Japanese pearl divers off Northern Queensland. In the supreme question of immigration, Japan is only a fascinating tinted herring. Young peoples with small populations and very large territories have more to fear than the alleged Japanese peril. They have three-quarters, and more, of the world before whom to prove their stewardship. For long enough the Dominions have sought to turn away the world's criticism, envy and resentment by talk of Japan's intentions. But the Ottawa policy has deprived the Dominions of this narcotic of false insecurity. May some stab of realism awaken them before it is too late. The world unsympathetically demands to know not the intentions of Japan, but the intentions of the occupiers of the last open lands.

Distance is not only ceasing to lend enchantment to the world political scene ; distance itself is fast becoming a fabulous Dodo. Is inter-racial political philosophy to lag behind travel-speed as domestic political philosophy has lagged behind factory-machine speed ?

To pose this question, be it repeated, implies no facile belief in "contacts." A prominent historian has expressed a doubt whether Anglo-Indian relations have not actually suffered as a result of rapid transport, the resulting increased leaves of absence, and the passing of the earlier less distracted residence of English servants of India in India. The return ticket sojourner is not always an improvement upon the exile.

But the decimation of distance has created a totally new set of questions, and a need for adaptation in our ideas of inter-racial relations.

It has been bluntly asserted above that commercial warfare (most people's idea of Peace) will play an ever less prominent part in affairs as the century moves on. Let England beware

of mistaking typical fireworks such as the following for the steady beacon light still lacking: ". . . men's vests and long pants, wholesale at 7s. 7d. a dozen . . . large celluloid dolls at 3d. and 6d. . . . rubber daggers which squeak when pressed, at 1d. and 2d. each . . . a set of toy soldiers at 6d., with a tent flying the Union Jack." (Economic League on Japanese competition.)

It is no policy for England if she merely squeaks when pressed, or sulks within the tent flying the Union Jack. Even if we are a nation of shopkeepers, our policy is not yet made for shopkeepers in a Foreign Office staffed by shopkeepers.

Let us also refuse to be dragged at the chariot tail of lily-white nations not at all distinguished for their dealings, at home or abroad, with other races, or of those nations who alone are blameless, the nations with no responsibilities in Asia and no knowledge of Asia.

Moreover, in the eyes of the East and the Far East, England's responsibility is not merely that of an equal among the responsible Westerners. And in particular dare it be forgotten that

England's position in India is not more important relative to the Far East than is England's position in the Far East relative to India.

The duty of the King's subjects transcends the chances of language or the geographical starting-point in Europe—Stratford (B.B.C. and nasal) and Greenwich are an obsession with many people.

To-day there is a tide in the affairs of races which can be taken effectively by England alone. There are winds encircling the world which blow right through the pretensions of unchivalrous old white women, who would deny to other races what they themselves shirk—the hazards of enterprise and the challenge of loyalty.

England, spurning the worst colour-crudities, will yet resume her true place, braced by the searching standards of fair play and even-handed justice, and unafraid of what leadership has always brought her—loneliness.

## CHAPTER IV

### OUR FORMER ALLY

#### THE SCEPTICS CHALLENGED

**M**OST English people, because of the circumstances of unemployment and the resulting defensive outlook in politics, may feel sceptical when invited to consider what chances there are of continued or renewed friendliness between England and Japan. If challenged, they might repudiate any lack of friendship towards Japan, and would deny that the dangerous campaign of a part of the press is typical of an admittedly changing attitude towards Japan ; or, to go some years back, that the failure to renew the Anglo-Japanese treaty must be accepted as a turning point for the worse in our relations with the Japanese Empire. But in a book such as this the attempt must be limited to setting forth the

attitude of different classes in Japan towards foreigners and, in particular, towards the British Empire, in the hope that it will arouse a sense of responsibility among the few people in England with the necessary background and knowledge who must try to save public opinion from being misled.

It is no part of the aim of this book to estimate the real sentiment of England towards Japan, even if the aim of all responsible writers about the Far East must be to discover a working understanding, and to challenge the fickle swing of opinion for the moment so hostile to Japan. If a picture is presented of the present state of opinion in Japan, with all its fears and disappointments and continuing loyalties, it may serve as a challenge to English people on their part to renew existing bases for friendship, where these bases appear to be undermined. The picture may serve as a warning to beware of flight into any hostility which, even if ephemeral on our part, might do more lasting damage in the Far East. This is, therefore, both a warning against trouble-makers and a challenge to sceptics.

It might be salutary if, when reading the account of what different classes and groups in Japan feel towards England, readers were all the time to put to themselves the question : “ Can we really claim any better record of freedom from ignorance, bias and muddle-headedness among corresponding people in our own country ? Can we claim greater willingness to believe the best, to remember happier relations, to recognize generously the finer characteristics of the Japanese by our own people ? ” With such reminders as an accompaniment, this account of the outlook in Japan makes its challenge.

To begin with the great mass of the Japanese people, the peasant-farmers, foreign residents in Japan, if asked what is the attitude of such people to the West, would probably reply : “ So far as we meet during holiday times or in passing through the country-side, we have only the most pleasant impressions of their unspoiled courtesy.” No country is safer for the foreigner to wander in with the absolute confidence that he will only meet with kindly, estimable folk. In the springtime,



when the cherry-blossom festival spirit takes the form of revels which include intoxication both from excitement and from the drinking of rice-saké, foreigners will still agree that it is perfectly safe to mingle with the immense crowds of country people. Nothing will happen worse than good-humoured badinage and laughing invitations to share the bottle or join in a few steps of a dance. At the temples, again, where the greatest concourses are to be found, no resentment but only the frankest and most pleasing curiosity about the foreigner will be shown. Tolerance of an amazing levelness, or something better than tolerance, namely, the feeling that its opposite never enters into the minds of the people, is an outstanding impression among foreigners who know Japan outside the cities. So much for treatment of the foreigner in the country-side. But new influences are undoubtedly at work. As the foreigner passes through villages of some size, he hears more frequently the intruding note of the city wireless and sees the invading posters of the film. In many hands is to be seen either the simplified

news-sheet or one of the multifarious magazines with which the country is littered and overlaid—those magazines of Japan choking the eager population with a grand salad of ill-assorted characters and pictures ; tales of knighthood crowding with impressions of the latest cruisers and guns, and these again swamped by huge visages of Hollywood or Tokio actresses, or the latest claims for automobiles or Western ties and suits ; or, more absorbing still, the volcano crater into which the latest romantic and heroic schoolgirl suicide has daintily plunged ; and overleaf again the never-failing appeal of the faithful retainer, the moon behind the pine trees and the Samurai lord bristling with mediæval armour and self-esteem.

It is to be remembered that from these villages come the fresh-faced and sturdy young soldiers, and it is the struggle for existence of these villages that largely determines the trend of politics in the Army, and so in part the policy of Japan.

What foreigner knows the gradually forming picture of the West in the mind of the villager and farmer ? If any picture has formed, it is too

soon to hazard a guess. But to go by the more easily observed city experience, there is probably as yet only a flatteringly wild surmise about Western life in its amazing extravagances. No doubt in time the Japanese country will experience misgivings and disillusionment as the miles of film unroll and the pages of the magazine turn, and the city imposes its view of foreign parts upon the country. But in the meantime, and perhaps for years to come, the foreigner will continue to enjoy his passage through the thatched villages of Japan and by many an ancient farmhouse; while the country-people (the vast majority of the population), will not be quick to take up the accusations, or to lend themselves very willingly to the propaganda of newspaper offices and the other factories of public opinion. How great is the country population of Japan, and how infinitesimal that of the cities! Surely there is a great background of slow-moving opinion that must act as a steadying influence upon a country feeling the full first reaction after a too hasty Westernization.

It is very problematical whether one Japanese countryman out of a thousand can distinguish between different Western foreigners.\* And when he turns his thoughts abroad, his only conscious prejudices will be a feeling of too easy superiority over the defeated Russians of thirty years ago, and a constantly fanned resentment against an Exclusion Act directed against his race and imposed in the very year following that of the Great Earthquake. If he bears any ill-will against England for giving up the Alliance it will be of the most hazy order, and at least it can confidently be said that his sketchy impressions of the English gained at school, or from returning adventurers to his village, or from the newer sources of news, are likely to be fully as favourable as those he has of other Western people.

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\* To give an example, I attended a dinner in Tokio in honour of Mr. Ward Price and myself. Besides us two the guests were all men, with some Japanese geisha girls in attendance. I had to squat Japanese fashion on the floor in my socks. By nine o'clock I felt I could not bear this any longer, so I turned to my host and asked his permission to stretch my legs. When I explained that I had an awful cramp, the pretty geisha who was in attendance on me lifted my leg to her lap and began to massage it. Mr. Ward Price, however, said he was not cramped and refused to be massaged. One little geisha present was not more than fourteen or fifteen. Mr. Ward Price put on his monocle and, looking at her, said to our host, "I think I have seen that little girl somewhere before." Thereupon our host asked the little geisha, "Have you seen this gentleman before?" She stared for some time at him, then remarked, "I don't remember. All foreigners look alike."

The memory of the Alliance must linger in the country. Indeed, in terms of prejudice and resentment, England is likely to be viewed much more favourably than the other Powers he has heard of. Put shortly, he knows that he was recently at war with Germany, that he has been insulted by America, and that he is well advised to avoid even the utterance of the word Russia.

To the huge fishing population the same general argument is applicable, with the additional reassurance that they must have heard of the opportunities enjoyed in Canada and other British waters. Besides this, there is the safe assumption that those fishermen who serve in the Japanese Navy and Merchant Marine are likely to return home with stories and impressions of England's Empire, and sailors and sea-tradition probably creditable to England and making for respect between two sea-going peoples.

The rumour of growing suspicion that the West is somehow cramping the advance of Japan must have reached the country-side, but there is much hope in the safe assertion that the vast majority of Japanese, the country-people, are at least not yet antagonized specifically against England.

## CHAPTER V

### THE WORKING CLASSES

COMING now to the great mass of the working class brings our survey to the city, and this narrows down in practice for most foreigners to Tokio and Yokohama, Kobé and Osaka. The first great difference from the country dweller is that these and all city dwellers are very much more aware of foreigners and foreign affairs. It is true that there are great tracts of the largest cities, Tokio and Osaka, where even the chance foreigner seldom goes. But there is a sufficiently large foreign community to provide the city-dweller with many opportunities of growing familiar with foreigners and foreign ways, so that he can distinguish with some certainty between the different peoples represented. Through familiarity, the city workman has probably long ago abandoned an El Dorado view of Western

lands. But if any one country till recently represented the dream of growing rich quickly, the U.S.A. probably had the most glamour. Among the older people there still survives a quite genuine admiration for the fabled lands across the sea, and they find it difficult to adjust the views they have grown up with to those of the younger generation. In terms of employment they knew the days of expansion and the days of war-boom. But what of the younger people and the very young? To them came the overpowering awakening of the Exclusion Act—an awakening out of a moderately hopeful dream of unchecked expansion and unbroken employment. Foreign countries, not confined to the U.S.A., once thought of positively as markets and even as emigration goals, increasingly revealed their less smiling aspect as jealous defenders of markets and racial competitors. The struggle of the ordinary factory hand, hard as it had been with every aid of exceptional times, grew heavier with instant acuteness and future anxieties. With such short experience of industrial life and

lacking the memory of great depressions, how much more bewildering must present conditions be for a Japanese factory worker, whether employed at viciously depressed wages because of general unemployment, or dependent in his unemployment upon the family system for his existence ; often upon the family farm, already in extremity. Japan's exporting policy is not of his making, nor has he ever dreamed of being taken into consultation with the new factory masters. He is only beginning to learn that depression of wages can be fought.

Here, then, is fertile ground for propaganda, whether well-founded or mischief-making. Upon such an industrial mass it must be easy to play, for the purposes of politicians who must divert attention away from immediate troubles. It is a vicious circle : the narrowing or saturated markets are real enough. The need for diverting propaganda among the workpeople can only be a growing one. England may sometimes be the subject of outcry, and workers of the Western world may at times be exhorted to unite (Chinese



of course excluded). But the flame of displeasure against English dominance in India, or English protection of markets, is a flickering one as compared to the steady fires of resentment, apprehension or contempt felt in varying degrees against America, Russia and China.

As a balancing reminder, let it be stated that the industrial masses in the one or two centres in Japan have little voice in shaping their country's policy; nor even an indirect voice, as has the farming class through the men and officers of the army. Arguments to follow will further emphasize the relative weakness of the voice of industry as a whole in shaping the policy of the Japanese Empire. But even if it were granted that the industrial masses of Tokio and Osaka are at least occasionally a political factor—as during the recent cotton disputes—can any sane man fail to regret the passing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, whose influence would have moderated the extremes of passion, and poured political oil upon the waters of industrial storm. If the popular press can sway a gullible crowd of factory

hands, how regrettable it is that policy (i.e. the Alliance relations of two great cotton peoples) is no longer there to curb that popular press.

In trying to give some account of the attitude of the professional classes, including university and student bodies, allowance must be made for the fact that there are fashions in the interest shown in one or another foreign people at different times. Thus at the present time there can be discerned a welcome restoration of interest in French thought and life among the younger university teachers.

If the question were asked: "Which is the best-known country, through travel, among university men?" only one answer can be given, namely, that the United States is the only Western country at all familiar to a great number. The ease and cheapness of making the journey across the Pacific, together with the indisputable attraction of easily-gained degrees at obscure colleges, accounts for the great number of average professional and university men whose direct knowledge of the West is derived from American

sources. Among the better elements in the teaching, medical and legal professions, the countries visited for study are more evenly distributed, with certain marked preferences for particular countries according to the subject of study. An example is the strong preference for the following of medical studies in Germany.

Imagination must be used in trying to assess the influence of residence in a Western country upon a Japanese student. The impression made upon him must be very much deeper than the influence produced upon a Western student by a Western foreign land. This may account for the way in which the returned Japanese will show marks of his country of academic origin for the rest of his life. To give lighter and physical examples, there is many a Japanese professor modelled exactly upon the German professor type of a former generation, even down to the cartoon moustache and collar, and brusque bearing. Among other returned exiles can be traced the sartorial and sporting influence of England, while the American-trained man reveals

very soon the kind of university from which he has drawn inspiration—whether those universally famed, those hardly even heard of, or those modestly and fortunately unknown to the outside world. Each of these men throughout his life, whether he be lawyer or doctor, or civil servant or teacher, is the conscious nucleus of pro-one country or another preferences and even propaganda. The professional class, therefore, does not so much form opinions regarding foreign lands as hold fast to a faith formed once and for all in its youthful odyssey in one or another of the Western lands. For this reason a foreigner finds it extremely difficult to generalize about the opinion of the professional class as a whole regarding any particular Western country. He sees, as it were, a well-drilled legion standing stiffly and loyally under three or four definite banners ; and in his intercourse with the separate sections he finds a very uncritical attitude of dutiful loyalty to a first love, and an equally uncritical blindness to the loves of those who visited other lands. No doubt great political events, such as the wars

of 1870 and 1914, or the never-forgotten Exclusion Act of 1924, can sometimes induce the marchers under the separate banners to go for a time in the same direction. But it would be safest to repeat that the adventure of going abroad to study is still so momentous an event in the life of a Japanese that he is an unchanging man for ever after.

If any cut and dried estimate is to be attempted of the relative regard in which different Western countries are held, there need be no fear of saying that England is at least taken for granted as a standard, not necessarily to be emulated, in many things—as, for example, professional ethics, regard for law and order, and dignity in public life. In short, as a country appealing to professional men because the professions hold a privileged and honoured position in it, England certainly impresses the upper middle-class of Japan. England may excite their curiosity less than do countries from which many new things are eagerly expected, but the esteem in which she is held is none the less because England does not compete with

certain other lands as a hat from which rabbits can be extracted.

The Japanese student is usually incredibly young for his years, and so his enthusiasms and judgment are less significant in the national life or as giving an indication of Japan's immediate future than most observers imagine. What the student of Japan thinks to-day will not at all necessarily be thought even by himself to-morrow. Very much more than a European student, he is impressed by the appearance and glittering surface of things and his mind is curiously unspeculative and uncritical, and so it follows that at least in the present stage he is a worshipper of novelty for the sake of newness and an unstable seeker after catchwords and slogans—a student of movies rather than of movements. Perhaps it is not too prejudiced to say that it also follows that his twin stars are what he thinks to be Russia and what he selects as typical of the United States. In the eyes of such an observer it is not to be wondered at that Europe is less enthralling. And so, even if it must be admitted that sometimes

Germany, sometimes Russia and many times America may have a much greater fascination for the Japanese student, yet there is an undoubted esteem or even a seldom admitted but cherished looking-up to England.

If the difficult question were posed : " What is the Japanese student's attitude towards England ? " the answer might be : His impressions of English rule in India are based upon sheer misrepresentation with an addition of the generous youthful aptitude to believe the worst. But his conception of what England herself stands for is of a land curiously rich in the makings and sources of modern life. He takes off his student cap to the ideology of a kind of J. S. Mill worship of freedom, and in the same movement he salutes that recurring wonder—the comprehensive achievement of the English Industrial Revolution. Then, again, he is obsessed with the old notion that gentlemen are made in England, and, broadly speaking, even if he suspects that England is seldom Stop Press News, at the back of his mind is a belief that England has many of the nobler

qualities, and that whatever may befall other lands she stands unshaken and unchanging, buttressed by that difficult thing to comprehend, "The English way of doing things."



## CHAPTER VI


### THE CLASSES THAT COUNT

IT has been suggested that the great peasant-farmer population has an indirect influence upon Japanese policy through its army sons, and that the city factory workers have little voice even if they are easily swayed by the Press ; further, it has been put forward that the professional and student class forms no solid block of opinion in favour of any Western country. But there is latent in all these sections of the population fully as much and probably more consistent good feeling towards the former ally, England, than towards the only other candidate for favour—the U.S.A.

But now the real makers of Japan's policy, the industrialists, the Services, the ruling class and Palace circles, remain for consideration. Where does the ultimate power of direction lie ?

And how does England stand in the estimation of the powers that really count? At the present time, for all that Karl Marx's economic interpretation of history is widely discarded, there is a danger that Japanese policy may be misinterpreted through undue importance being attached to the economic offensive of Japanese industry against the older western markets. This is to flatter the big business captains of Japan. Foreign residents in Japan know well how precarious is the position of the industrialists, the cotton and silk kings, and the bankers. Does not even one influential concern, all-powerful in its own esteem, make gifts running into millions for charity just to buy off the criticism of the public? There was a time perhaps in boom days when the true situation was quite obscured, but the very exaggerations of that situation were the means of revealing afresh the source of the real direction of policy. Japan is at once far behind the times and most up to date. Her use of machinery far outstrips her discretion both in marketing and in the treatment of the industrial masses. But

these masses begin to have most powerful advocates in the persons of the aristocratic class which supply the officers of the fighting services. These men, to many foreign eyes, may be only the reckless leaders of the youngest modernized State. To those who know Japan they offer a spectacle difficult for Western observers to credit—a spectacle of the fighting services as prophets of a better order and greater social justice, especially on the land, and cherishing an often naïve belief in the possibility of regeneration at home concurrent with sustained outlay upon Greater Japan policy abroad. Theoretical National-Socialism, before coming to power in Italy or Germany, is a Western parallel, but not a close or safe parallel. There is the true tug-of-war in Japan to-day between visionary officers and short-sighted industrialists, and it would be far easier to foretell the future if the officer class resembled more closely its average prototype abroad and if the leaders in industry had as much voice in the making of policy as is attributed to them abroad. One simple illustration will throw into relief the



THE MAIN AUDITORIUM OF THE TOKYO IMPERIAL UNIVERSITY



need for close study of military idealism in Japan. It is to be found in the much-discussed State of Manchukuo, where the military are in theory strongly opposed to the granting of unconditional concessions to the great industrial and financial concerns of Japan proper.\* Or, again, all who have come into contact with General Araki must have been impressed by the significance of that figure out of all proportion to the impression made by his deliberately resounding and popular speeches delivered with the immediate purpose of unifying the people and ultimately of slowly educating them for more than mere conquest.

In contemporary Japan the prophets and seers and forward-looking leaders are to be found not among the foreign-trained big business men or professors, or the comparatively static priesthood, but among the united class whose tradition is that of the real Japan unchanged by the surface mechanical revolution wrought for half a century

\* During the campaign, foreign observers saw the representatives of the great industrial concerns in Japan refused permits, by the military, to visit Manchuria. Concessions were peremptorily withheld.

by outside influences. The most responsible class in Japan to-day is the officer class. Therefore it is of prime importance to inquire how the various Western powers stand in the eyes of the military and naval clans.

Let it be freely admitted that the allied victors in the late war are not necessarily regarded as models of military and naval sagacity. Perhaps no ally or enemy in the war has gained at all in prestige from the Japanese theoretical or staff point of view. Japan has passed the stage when she feels that her own military ideas must be modelled upon foreign forces, but the important question can still be asked : " With which foreign peoples do Japanese officers feel at home, instinctively ? Which foreigners do they regard highly for their national qualities ? Towards which do they feel any spontaneous liking or respect ? "

As to the Navy, whose officers many foreigners feel to be the finest type of Japanese fighting men, and perhaps the most easily appreciated type in Japan, there is no doubt at all that England

stands very high in their esteem—even if the Japanese Navy allows itself the luxury of expressing its own superiority in every type of vessel over its former instructor. The bond of the sea may be an overworked phrase, but it is one of the deepest of bonds, and here is an important element in Japanese life making for mutual respect and great liking between England and Japan. Perhaps it is the strongest link between any element of Japanese life and the outside world. And this is said with full knowledge of the intense feeling aroused by the strengthening of the defences at Singapore.

With regard to the Army, England can claim no such indisputable pre-eminence of esteem; probably in theory the German model suffered little as a result of its defeat in the late war. But, taking the wider view, it may be said with some confidence that the very important Army opinion in Japan finds the qualities of stability and power in its essential estimate of British character. History compels the esteem of the Japanese services, when they look out upon the



world and view England's achievement. To put it with excessive charity, in the services there is no question whatever of considering the United States as a competitor for laurels of esteem or natural friendly admiration. It was said that the German Army still evokes respect, but the fighting clans of Japan certainly hold England in a quite special regard. Surely there is excuse enough in all this for regret, from the service point of view, at least, that the Alliance so honourably observed by Japan no longer provides a constant of unity between the Japanese and British Empires—a fund of honourable dutifulness in word and action upon which to draw in days of strain in civil markets.

Monetary gain is the motive of big business internationalism. An honoured Alliance has been allowed to lapse. Anglo-Japanese policy is sicklied o'er with trading squabbles in the world of to-day.

Little need be said about the discredited professional politicians of Japan, for the very good

reason that ultimate policy emanates less and less from them. The Inukai murder closed an epoch. As the huge new Parliament building in Tokio nears marble completion, just as rapidly does the probability fade that it will ever be used for its original purpose. In times of national emergency Japan summons back to leadership old tried administrators and military and naval heroes ; or if a stray politician is retained it is because his age is a bridge from older times when the idea of Western democracy was not yet slimed over by corruption on a trans-Pacific model. Thus the situation is starkly defined, and historic Nippon reasserts her sway over twentieth century Japan with its meretricious façade of Westernization. Aristocratic forces are again in the saddle. The traditional ruling influences grasp the reins. Let no foreign statesman ever for a moment forget this key to Japanese policy : behind all Japanese belief, expression and striving rise, like the clouds in a gold screen, the sacred walls and gate towers of the hidden Palace—the symbol of Japan's soul, its

fountain head and its shrine, the very sun of all its system.

Here we arrive at the core of the argument concerning Japan and England. Bismarck spoke of the imponderables in politics. There is nothing imponderable or defying assessment in the question whether Japan's ruling class, inspired by loyalty to the Imperial House, and seeking ever to conserve and strengthen the throne, believes or does not believe in friendship with England. It does believe so ; and this is no picturesque evasion in the cause of traditionalism. This basic truth needs no exploitation ; it need only be remembered and recognized to yield its implications. The fact stands that the great Western monarchy, the centre of the British Empire, possesses in its attitude to national constitutional life a link of understanding with Imperial Japan that is lacked by any republic, oligarchy or tyranny on earth.

Expressed from the Far Eastern point of view, Japan was never in need of China's lesson that collapse and utter chaos follow hard upon the disappearance of the kingly principle, and the

innermost circle of policy builders surrounding and voicing the will of the Japanese throne can never depart very far or for long from the challenging and warning guidance of history : " The Emperor and his subjects have only one tried friend—England."

## CHAPTER VII

### SOME MISUNDERSTANDINGS CLEARED UP

IT is a commonplace of history that economic causes lie at the root of most wars and international disturbances. The famous dictum of Thucydides that wars arise "not about unimportant things, but out of unimportant things" (*ou peri mikron all' ek mikron*) may be taken as a veiled reference to the economic causes of all wars, and many moralists and historians have drawn a comparison between the real motives of greed and what is now called "economic nationalism," which create and foster wars, and the supposed motives of "national honour," "national dignity," "defence of the sacred soil of the Fatherland," etc., which are more often paraded as motives.

That "Mine and Thine" has on many occasions been the root cause of the world's discord is true ;

nevertheless it is misunderstanding that is at the root of much of the trouble and strife. Apart from economic rivalries, misunderstanding is a real barrier between nation and nation, between man and man and often between individuals of the same family. I use "misunderstanding" in its simplest sense of an involuntary failure to see the other fellow's point of view. How many quarrels between individuals might be avoided if *A* were in a position to see *B*'s point of view, or vice versa? *A* may be in genuine conflict or rivalry with *B*, but it may happen that he lacks the necessary data on which to form a reasonable judgment of *B*'s case and may thus, without malice prepense, be led to misjudge his opponent's perhaps quite reasonable, though not perfectly reasonable, case. If this is possible between individuals, how much more is it possible between those great agglomerations of population which are to-day, sometimes with small ethnological justification, covered with the name of "nation"?

Let us therefore take as our two main underlying causes of war (*a*) economic rivalry ("Mine

and Thine") and (b) misunderstanding (an involuntary failure to appreciate the other side). The recent outburst of anti-Japanese propaganda, instigated by "Mine and Thine," has gained much ground through a perfectly honest misunderstanding of the situation in the Far East among the general public in England, on the Continent of Europe and, of course, in the United States of America. But Japan, so far as England is concerned, may rest assured that her case is receiving fair and sympathetic handling in authoritative quarters as well as in responsible press organs, such as *The Times*. An honest endeavour to remove some of the more important misunderstandings will lead an earnest seeker after truth to the knowledge of some very striking facts. These facts may be most conveniently itemized under the following headings: Population, Export Trade, and Industrial Conditions.

How many people who read in their daily papers of Japan's war-lords, her unprovoked aggression against peaceful China, her militarist press and her all-powerful military caste, ever

stop to think that these mighty panjandrums, whom they endow with super-human or infra-satanic qualities, are wrestling with a problem the gravity and urgency of which has hardly been approached in the history of the world. The problem is simply that of increasing population. The total land area of the Empire of Japan is 252,085·3 square miles, of which Japan proper accounts for 143,558·8 square miles. Housed in this comparatively small area (I speak of Japan proper only) is a population of approximately sixty-six million people, which is relentlessly increasing at the rate of about one million per year. This is to say that in the next ten years Japan must somehow find work and food for nearly ten million more people than are employed and fed to-day. Roughly speaking, with all allowances and deductions made, employment must be found annually for two hundred and fifty thousand additional persons. The urgency of the problem of accommodation pure and simple can hardly ever have been greater in the history of any country in the world. In this connection



it may be interesting to recall that the area of Great Britain and Ireland, including the Irish Free State, is 121,101 square miles, with a population of approximately forty-six millions; the area of France is 212,895 square miles, with a population of approximately forty-one millions; the area of Germany is 182,200 square miles, with a population of approximately sixty-five millions; and the area of Italy is 119,743 square miles, with a population of approximately forty-five millions.

When we turn to the consideration of the climatic conditions under which these sixty-six millions of Japanese have to live and work, we find that conditions are even worse than might have been supposed from the figures given above. We find the astonishing fact that of the total area of the four big islands which constitute Japan proper, barely eighteen per cent. is cultivable. This is a percentage which is even less than the cultivable area of ancient Greece in the days of the city states and their perpetual internecine wars. It has often been asked why the ancient Greeks, with their high level of culture

MISUNDERSTANDINGS CLEARED UP 75

and civilization, should have been perpetually at war one with another, and the answer has always been found in the statement that twenty-two per cent. only of the total area of what was then Greece was cultivable, and that the poor wretches fought for the harvests. Japan's cultivable area is four per cent. lower than that of ancient Greece and her population is in proportion immeasurably higher.

This is not a problem which can be solved by birth control. The workers are already born and there is no room for them on the Japanese farms. Remember that Japan is still pre-eminently an agricultural country. We have all been brought up to believe that Belgium is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, and any traveller through Belgium can bear witness to the crowded nature of the country-side. Except in the more mountainous district of the Ardennes, one is never out of sight of a house. Yet Belgium's population per square kilometre of cultivated land is only three hundred and ninety-four compared with Japan's nine hundred and fifty-nine.

The plain fact is that Japan is now passing through that increase in population, due to an industrial revolution, through which our own country and the chief industrial countries of Europe passed in the nineteenth century. During her period of seclusion from the rest of the world, Japan's population remained stationary at about thirty million. From the period of the opening of Japan to Western civilization and to Western methods, the population has more than doubled in about seventy years. Nor should it be forgotten that it was the Western Powers who created this terrific increase in population. It was not Japan's desire to enter into relations with the rest of the world, it was the modern world's insane pursuit of markets which dragged Japan at the chariot wheels of industrial development and has created what is now a Frankenstein monster at which many people hold up their hands in holy horror. But few seem to realize that they are looking upon their own handiwork.

Many other interesting comparisons might be made. It may, for example, be pointed out that

the infertile and mountainous islands which constitute Japan proper have a square mileage about one and a half times as great as that of New Zealand. These islands are inhabited by sixty-six million persons as against New Zealand's one and a half million. It might be stated that New Zealand possesses at any given moment about twenty-seven and a half million sheep, whereas Japan has just twenty-three thousand. New Zealand has about four million head of cattle, including dairy cows, whereas Japan has four hundred and ninety-eight thousand and no more than two hundred and seventy thousand goats. When I was in New Zealand I stayed with a relative of mine, a run-holder, who alone possessed twenty thousand sheep and one thousand head of cattle.\* When I asked him how many men he had to look after his run and his live stock, he told me he had twelve. Now, that one run-holder in New Zealand possessed almost double the number of sheep to be found in all Japan.

A hundred or even sixty years ago the obvious answer to Japan's problem would have been

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\* One sheep owner in N. Z. possesses a flock of over thirty-eight thousand.

emigration. But emigration is no longer practical politics. All countries with suitable climates are now closed to that. It would be a waste of time to labour this point. When British subjects are—rightly or wrongly—denied access to British dominions except under the regulations of increasingly diminishing quotas, it is idle to expect immigration countries to admit large numbers of an alien race. The solution must be sought somehow along other lines—always with the fearful thought in the background that the ultimate solution might prove to be war and conquest.


Everything possible is being done to grapple with the gigantic problem of food supplies for the population of Japan. Improved methods of cultivation have been introduced, and in 1926 the Department of Agriculture and Forestry submitted a Thirty Year Plan, the main object of which was to provide for the nourishment of the population by all available scientific means. But even this plan, if fully successful, cannot meet the increased population requirements after thirty

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years. Japan is therefore faced with the problem of being unable to feed her population in little more than a generation from the time of writing.

This is not a problem which can be met with a shrug of the shoulder. Later on, in the section on Export, I shall endeavour to show that the same problem is confronting Great Britain in a much less intensive form. From the purely demographic point of view, however, what has been said above will serve to state the case.

Japan is not rich in natural resources. Particularly is she deficient in the raw materials of industry. Only in a few exceptional cases is there any surplus for export, *e.g.* in cocoons for silk, and in coal. As regards raw silk, Japan is the most important single producer in the world, her exports of this commodity representing 55.9 per cent. of the total world production in 1928, and an average of thirty-seven per cent. of her total exports over the period 1927-29. As regards coal the situation is different, though Japan produces a considerable quantity of coal and

exports many million yensworth. Her necessities—mainly for industrial purposes—are such as to lead to the import of more coal than she exports. What really helps Japanese export trade, however, is the remarkably low standard of living, according to our Western ideas and requirements, for the Japanese live chiefly on rice and fish and need but little for personal expenses and their simple pleasures. Houses, in view of the danger of earthquakes, are built of wood and paper. Salaries of the highest officials are below the minimum of the American income tax level. It is, therefore, not sweated labour, but cheap living, that has, during the last thirty years, built up Japan's export industry, with Japanese patriotism as a driving force. Having bought the latest machinery in England, Japan has learned to work and improve it and now produces goods to meet any competition, the prices, sustained by the depreciated yen, being extremely low. India, Africa, East and West Indies are particularly hard hit and British goods have suffered in these markets.



NAKANOSHIMA OSAKA





When I was in Osaka I was allowed to visit one of the largest mills in that city, which is the Manchester of Japan. The owner took me through the works and I asked him how he could compete with such old established industries as those of Lancashire. His reply was simple: "Because Lancashire is old and we are young." I asked him what he meant exactly by that. "Well," he said, pointing to a long corridor of machines, "you see those looms working. Well, all these machines come from Lancashire, not one hundred miles away from your own big cotton mills." Then, pointing to a man dressed in blue shorts and overall, he said: "You see that man? He looks after twenty-four looms; in Lancashire, I believe, a man can only look after six, because your trade unions insist upon this regulation. The kind of machinery they use in Manchester is quite out of date; I would not have it inside this building to waste space. We can work with our looms three shifts. Your people in Lancashire are unintelligently conservative in their methods of working and, of course, I must admit they are

handicapped by trade union regulations. You do not work together the way we do in Japan. There is a barrier between master and servant. Here in Japan we work one for all and all for one."

The native supply of raw cotton is totally inadequate to meet the demand in Japan, which ranks third among the cotton-consuming countries of the world. Cotton spinning has undoubtedly become one of the most important industries in Osaka, where there are no less than fifty mills. It is also carried on in Tokio, Okayama and one or two other places. The average number of spindles in operation daily is seven million, which makes Japan now rank about sixth among the leading cotton-spinning countries of the world, a creditable achievement considering that her industry is only a little more than thirty years old. I have not the latest statistics available, but even in 1930 Japan's total production was four hundred and forty-two thousand tons, valued at four hundred and thirty-two million yen, and the export of cotton yarn and cotton goods amounted to

twenty per cent. of the total value of the export trade of the country.

According to my friend, Captain Kennedy, Reuter's correspondent in Tokio, who, like Mr. Hugh Byas, *The Times* correspondent, is exceedingly well and accurately informed, Japan is now the largest exporter of cotton textiles in the world and has replaced Great Britain in this respect. He gives the following comparative figures compiled by the British Board of Trade and the Japanese Ministry of Finance, which tell the story :

				GT. BRITAIN	JAPAN
				Sq. Yards	Sq. Yards
				Million	Million
1928	-	-	-	3,866	1,418
1929	-	-	-	3,671	1,790
1930	-	-	-	2,406	1,571
1931	-	-	-	1,716	1,413
1932	-	-	-	2,198	2,031
1933 (8 months)	-	-	-	1,549	1,568

Osaka is the greatest industrial city of the Orient. Altogether there are five thousand seven

hundred factories with a total production valued at eight hundred million yen. Besides cotton mills and factories, this city possesses iron foundries and machinery works. The majority of the mill-owners, I may add, are Japanese Christians, being mostly Nonconformists, like their Lancashire brethren, or rivals ! There are no fewer than seventy-five churches in Osaka ; only six are Roman Catholic, the remaining sixty-nine being Methodist, Congregationalist and Church of England.

At another big mill I visited in that city I also took the opportunity of discussing with the managing director the question of " dumping." I pointed out that Japan had exported more cotton to Australia in 1932 and 1933 than Great Britain. His reply was : " Do you know how much wool we bought from Australia in comparison with what Lancashire has bought ? " I said I did not know, but had an idea they had bought a good deal of wool for making clothing, blankets, etc., for their army in Manchuria. " Quite right," he said. He mentioned the amount, but was not

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sure of the exact figures. I have since ascertained that in the first ten months of 1933 Japan bought from Australia wool to the value of one hundred and forty-three million yen and sold to Australia miscellaneous goods to the value of forty-two million. He then turned to the complaints of Lancashire against Japanese "dumping," and said he thought that British people, who love fair play, ought to realize the fact that Japan has bought from Britain in the last fourteen years approximately two hundred and fifty million pounds sterling worth of goods, while Great Britain in return has bought only eighty-five million pounds worth from Japan. In other words, Great Britain has profited by about one hundred and fifty-three million pounds in her trade with Japan during these years. "Surely," he exclaimed, "it is a little unjust, not to say ungrateful, on the part of the Lancashire people to carry on propaganda against Japan now that trade between the two countries is tending to move towards the level at which exports and imports meet. We are," he added, "a nation

of shopkeepers, as Napoleon once called the British, and surely we have as much right to trade as any European nation. If, as you say, we undersell, it is not our object to do so, but it is because of the fall of the yen. If we have to buy raw material, like cotton, from India, or machinery from England, or wool from Australia, we cannot go and buy pounds and rupees at our present rate of exchange to pay for the goods ; we are obliged, so to speak, to barter. We send cotton and silk fabrics and we get in exchange raw material or machinery. When you get back to England, try and remove this misunderstanding, because although we have no written alliance now with your country, we still feel that England is our best friend and I hope and trust she will remain so."

In any case, the British residents in Japan, Korea and Manchukuo whom I met deplore the fact that certain papers in England, for reasons best known to their proprietors, allow themselves to be used for spreading poisonous propaganda against our former ally and still good friend.

They, like myself, are satisfied that if we maintain friendly relations with the Japanese Government and people, we can have the whole of the Far East as a market, and it is hoped that our industrialists and manufacturers will face facts and make up their minds that it is not by abusing the Japanese and their methods that they will hold their own, but by adopting the latest scientific means of production as employed by their Japanese competitors. Japanese competition has in fact come to stay. This is confirmed by a statement published by *The Times* in November, 1933, in a letter sent to Sir Herbert Austin by a British merchant resident in Japan for thirty years. I cannot do better than quote from what he says :

“ I have seen a good deal recently in the English press of unfair Japanese competition, and much has been written of the low standard of living of the Japanese working classes, and of conditions in factories and mills. For the most part it is without foundation. True, the standard of living is below that



of Britain : you cannot change a nation in a decade from the frugal standards of centuries of living, but all the Japanese live well according to their own standards. . . . Lancashire is crying out to-day and Yorkshire will be crying out to-morrow. I have seen woollen goods sold at a cost below what we pay for the spun wool in England. It is new to see wool in Japan. It has developed these last few years, but Japan was Australia's biggest buyer last year and her exports are already assuming size. Every village now has wools on sale for knitting and many shops display knitted goods. I saw some worsted cloth some days ago which I could not distinguish from West of England weaving. This is the product of one weaving centre only as yet, but it will develop and Yorkshire will feel the effect of the competition.

“ In cotton spinning there is a demonstration mill, run by the maker of the looms, where one girl ‘ tends ’ thirty-eight looms ! This is an absolute fact. There are thousands

of looms running where the girls tend over twenty each. The operatives are young, at their very brightest from, say, fourteen to twenty-three, and then they leave to get married. The cotton mills always have new fresh vigour to run their machinery, not, as in many English mills, with operatives who have worked on the same looms and frames, in cases I know, quite fifty years.

“You read of the awful conditions of the Japanese workpeople, but it is mostly false. The cotton operatives have fine living quarters, artistic garden surroundings, and recreation centres with concert-rooms and theatres all free. Each month an excursion is given them to some historic point of interest, and they are taught concerning those places, thus providing education in an attractive form.

“In heavy engineering we may soon see Japan as a power to be reckoned with. There is a project for a steel works near Kobe, where the pig-iron to be exported

from Manchuria will be refined and converted. A harbour is to be dredged, giving a channel at any state of the tide, and the furnaces will occupy some five hundred acres. The land has been acquired and already the foreshore is being reclaimed. There was infinite wisdom, if nothing else, in Japan's 'Assistance to Manchuria to control her future destiny.' Some of the finest coal and iron ore in the world, and also gold, is in Manchuria.

"It has become suddenly cold in Japan, and I entered a department store yesterday to buy a pair of gloves. I selected a dark brown pair of deerskin, very well made and quite up to the standard of a seven-and-six-penny pair in Birmingham, though perhaps not as flaring as the lemon-coloured guinea pairs we sometimes see. They are good quality and most serviceable, and the price was ninety-five sen. At to-day's rate of exchange one shilling and a penny!

"The sooner we realize that Japan is going

to come into our market even in face of heavy duties, the sooner may we find some means of improving our methods of production."

On this point it might not be out of place to refer in very brief outline to some of the more important features of present-day industrial conditions in Japan. There is much misunderstanding and ignorance on the subject in Western countries, and the people of Great Britain are no exception to this rule. Those who may care to go more deeply into the question will find an admirably full exposé of the subject in "Industrial Labour in Japan," published last year by the International Labour Office (Studies and Reports, Series A (Industrial Relations), No. 37).

The first and greatest misunderstanding to be cleared up about industrial conditions in Japan is the misunderstanding that arises from the conception of Japan as a backward country, with a low standard of living, where workers under primitive conditions are forced to labour for ridiculously small wages, thus enabling a heavily

subsidized industry to export largely, to the detriment of other exporting countries. Japan is not a backward State working under primitive conditions. The industrial machine of Japan is a highly modernized concern working under very nearly the same industrial conditions as those obtaining in the countries of the West. Workers and employers are strongly organized, for the Trade Union movement in Japan, though of recent growth, is developing rapidly. In the last generation hours of work have been steadily reduced. The whole machine is supervised and governed by a Bureau of Social Affairs set up in 1922, the operations of which extend to cover ninety per cent. of the workers in all Japanese factories.

Conditions of child-labour compare favourably with those in many so-called more advanced countries. The minimum age for admission to employment is fourteen. Exceptionally bright children who complete their elementary school course at the age of twelve may, under certain conditions, be admitted into certain of the easier

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industries at that age, but this is an exception, depending entirely upon the capability of the child.

As regards wages, these may appear low when converted, as they often are, into foreign currencies at the present exchange rate of the depreciated yen, but this cannot be a fair statement of the purchasing power of such wages within the country. A careful comparison of these wages with the cost of living at given times in Japan, will serve to show that wages are not so low as has been openly stated. Between 1926 and 1930 net wages showed a distinct tendency to rise, and in comparison with the cost of living it can be stated that in 1930 an average Japanese worker could buy nearly half as much again with his wages as he could in 1926. These are not indications of a "slave" industry.

It is frequently urged against Japan that the Government grants export subsidies, and that this enables Japan to compete unfairly with her trade rivals. This is an accusation which comes strangely from a country which has established and maintained an Export Premium fund, and

keeps a whole Department (the Department of Overseas Trade) to administer this fund, amongst its other duties. Surely the point is that countries which must live by export must do everything they can to export. Until such time as a Free Trade millennium descends upon us—which seems far off—it is idle to blame Japan for doing what we have been doing ourselves for many years.

A few words in conclusion on Japan as a customer of Great Britain. Japan is one of Great Britain's best customers. Since the War our exports to Japan have been considerably greater than our imports from Japan. It has been estimated that in the years 1919-32, Great Britain had a favourable trade balance over Japan of about one hundred and fifty-three million pounds. From 1920 to 1929 inclusive, British exports to Japan tended to be three, four and in some years even five times the amount of Japan's exports to Britain. In the last three years, of course, the balance has inclined to be more even, but even to-day it shows a profit in favour of Great Britain.

It would be easy to enter into many details amplifying the above general sketch. Enough has been said, however, I think, to clear away one or two fundamental misconceptions.



## CHAPTER VIII

### JAPAN AND THE LEAGUE

IN dealing with all subjects, let alone controversial subjects, it is always as well to define one's terms in advance. The subject of this chapter is "Japan and the League." I think I may claim to have tried to define the term "Japan" in the earlier chapters of this book, and to have done my best to remove certain misunderstandings prevalent in Western countries concerning the meaning of that word. Since Japan has been unfortunately in conflict with an entity known as the "League," it is equally necessary that I should lay down in language as unmistakable as possible what I understand by this term, the "League."

There have been almost as many conceptions of the "League" as there have been of "Japan." In a world honeycombed with telegraphic agencies,


cheap papers, cinema publicity, and all the engines of modern pseudo-culture, it is amazing that so few people—in our own country at any rate—should know what the League is, what purposes it was intended to serve, and how it fulfils its functions. How many adults in Great Britain to-day could answer the following plain question : What is the difference between the League of Nations and the League of Nations Union ?

The opinion of the man and woman in the street in our country varies between a vague surprise that some odd job created by the Peace Treaty should still be functioning, and an equally vague hostility to some band of busybodies assembled in Geneva who claim to dictate to the world the way it should go, and pretend to a higher morality than that practised by their fellow-creatures. The former conception was well exemplified by a dear old lady whom I met once in the train between Paris and Geneva some five years after the establishment of the League. I was of some slight service to her in connection with the Customs at the French frontier, and we

got into conversation during the remainder of the journey. In the course of this she asked me why I was going to Geneva. I answered that I was going to attend, as a newspaper correspondent, a meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. "Dear me," she said—"the League of Nations! Is that still going on?" This was in 1924.

The latter view is well presented in Great Britain's yellow press, where there are almost daily diatribes against "the follies of Geneva," "Labour's Nest of Luxury" (meaning the austere offices of the International Labour Office, of which more anon), and such-like attacks.

The plain fact, which cannot be too often repeated, is that the League of Nations is an instrument created by the Powers of the world to further international peace and international co-operation. The Powers of the world, and in particular the Great Powers, are the masters of that instrument. If the instrument is not properly used it is hardly for the workman to blame his tools. The legend of an assembly of cranks claiming to control the world from Geneva is almost as



YOKOHAMA HARBOUR



despicable a misrepresentation as the misrepresentation of Japan as a backward country employing slave labour and so competing successfully and unfairly in the markets of the world. Let us be decent to both sides, since we are bound to admit that "Japan" has come into conflict with the "League." A lot of nonsense is talked about both organizations. Japan is an ancient Empire with an unbroken tradition of thousands of years, enshrining a culture from which many Western civilizations could do worse than take hints. She has a high national sense of honour, a strong sense of devotion to duty and a very exalted level of national education. Let us not dismiss such people as "yellow bandits," or with any other convenient cliché designed mainly for the purpose of avoiding the necessity of thinking out a difficult problem. The League, on the other hand, is not a body of intrusive spinster-minded fanatics, carving out jobs for themselves in Geneva by claiming to regulate the morals of national governments. The League is both an instrument and an idea. As an instrument it is the slave of

fifty-odd governments which finance and direct it. As an idea it is the greatest and most significant international experiment since the Holy Roman Empire; it is the last conception of human wisdom in the final effort to avoid those murderous wars which everyone knows must sooner or later bring down the civilizations both of East and West into irretrievable ruin. Let us think of the protagonists in this dispute in that fashion, and not in the fashion adopted with so much facility by the press which we read every day.

Here, then, are the protagonists, the one a great living community of peoples assembled in an Empire, the other an instrument and an idea. Let us see how these opposing forces were actually confronted, bearing always in mind that the great Empire was one of the masters of the instrument, and let us see also how all those masters combine to handle that instrument. Only so shall we begin to understand the tragedy of the misunderstanding between Japan and the League. For the essence of tragedy is not the conflict of good and bad, but the conflict of good and good.

The Sino-Japanese conflict at the League of Nations began during the very first Session of the Assembly. China then put forward a claim to a permanent seat on the Council, and I well remember the Japanese delegate, at the plenary meeting of the Assembly, opposing the motion on the ground that China had not fulfilled all the obligations required by a State because she had not observed "international obligations," also in regard to her military, naval and air forces and armaments. In other words, it was plainly stated then that China had no central government.

Japan's complaint has been justified by events, for China still has no stable government and has not even paid up her contributions to the League, though she has now funded them on a fixed basis. True, many other States, members of the League, have likewise not paid their contributions and, like China, have no central government and are constantly engaged in internecine warfare. But these petty States, whether black or half black, have not come into conflict with a Great Power



like Japan, and consequently have not drawn so much attention to themselves. There is no doubt that in the Manchurian conflict Japan made a great mistake at the outset in not presenting her case in such a way as to appeal to European Members of the League.

Firstly, Japan never pressed the question of the Chinese boycott of everything Japanese in Manchuria and in China generally. Secondly, she failed to impress upon the Members of the League the fearful reign of terror in Manchuria caused by the War Lords, who were squeezing the very life out of its thirty million inhabitants. Thirdly, she did not sufficiently emphasize the fact that China was refusing to carry out her solemn obligations under her Treaties with Japan. When, on October 26th, 1931, the Japanese Government communicated to the League of Nations Council a declaration in which it signified its willingness to enter into direct negotiations with China on the basis of five "basic principles," China refused to agree on the fifth point concerning Treaty Rights. Let me give these five "basic principles" :

1. Mutual repudiation of aggressive policy and conduct.
2. Respect for China's territorial integrity.
3. Complete suppression of all organized movements interfering with freedom of trade and the stirring up of international hatred.
4. Effective protection throughout Manchuria of all peaceful pursuits undertaken by Japanese subjects.
5. Respect for Treaty Rights of Japan in Manchuria.

China replied that she was prepared to accept the first four points, but refused to agree to respect Japan's Treaty Rights in Manchuria. In the words of Sir Austen Chamberlain, the League "got between the two parties" and thus prevented the Chinese and the Japanese from settling their squabble between themselves.

When I was in Peking in 1933, I was invited by one of the most enlightened of Chinese professors to meet at his house all his colleagues of the Peking University and Colleges. We spent a

whole afternoon discussing the work of the League in connection with the Sino-Japanese conflict. I asked the company why China refused to accept point five of the Memorandum of October 26th, and the reply was: "Because we were led to believe that the League was going to settle our dispute with Japan for us." Here again, by acts and utterances of the Governments at Geneva, the Chinese were led to believe that the League would somehow or other pick the chestnuts out of the fire for China.

Anyone who was present at the League meetings dealing with the Sino-Japanese conflict, whether at the Council or Assembly, who was not a paid pacifist or a crank, and watched the proceedings impartially, could not help at times feeling that Japan did not get a fair hearing. I was even once or twice put in mind of a famous picture representing Pilate with the Christ before the mob saying: "I can find no fault with this man," and the mob shouting: "Crucify him."

Of all the sad sittings at which I was present during the meetings of the League

over a period of nearly fourteen years at Geneva and elsewhere, those meetings on the Sino-Japanese conflict were the saddest of all. In the words of an American lady journalist, who has, I believe, a book in print entitled "Arms and the Men at Geneva," the greatest paradox in this, the first great test of the new international machinery, was that those who urged the loudest that the League "do something," were the very ones who had been afraid to join the League for fear of getting drawn into just such a conflict. As one American expressed it when in Geneva not long before the trouble occurred in the Far East: "I'd be for joining the League except for not wanting my country drawn into any old war that happens to break out somewhere on the face of the globe. For instance, I would not want to be obliged to send troops because of trouble, let us say, between Russia and Persia." His fixed idea was that members of the League of Nations are obliged to apply sanctions, even military sanctions, and nothing, not even a reading of the Covenant, would convince him of the

contrary. Yet this worthy U.S. citizen was among those who sneered at the statesmen in Geneva for not applying sanctions against Japan.

Another paradox discernible in Geneva was that the statesman who was foremost in upbraiding Japan for having "broken" the Kellogg Pact, was the spokesman of a country which had refused to ratify that very Pact without attaching reservations which would permit his Government to do what Japan had done, and that without brooking any questions as to the right of self-defence, even on foreign territory. No wonder the American writer exclaims: "Will wonders, not to speak of follies, never cease?"

Still another paradox was the sending and selling of arms and munitions of war to the Far East, not only after the armed conflict had broken out, but years previously, by the nations piously berating the belligerents for using the arms which their nationals had sold. During this period a steady dividend of twenty-five per cent. was paid by Schneider-Creusot, the great French arms industry; the Skoda works in Czechoslovakia

paid twenty per cent., and Vickers in England jumped from a modest five to eight per cent.

The British Government proposed an embargo on all exports of arms and ammunition to both China and Japan, but not a single other government, either in Europe or in America, would support it.

The plain truth is that the whole affair was sadly botched. The acrid discussions over the finance of the Lytton Commission coincided with the birth of the unknown State of Manchukuo, fathered by Japan, though the maternity may have been somewhat in doubt. The statesmen at Geneva were faced with what amounted to peremptory orders from Washington to repudiate the infant at all costs, while Japanese troops were engaged in chasing bandits up to the Great Wall of China, and incidentally adding Jehol and other jewels to the crown of the infant State. Can confusion go further? Is it not only fair to admit faults on both sides?—a strange lack of diplomacy on the part of the ancient Empire in its dealings with the new instrument, and a strange lack of

knowledge and sympathy on the part of the wielders of that instrument in dealing with the complex problems of the ancient Empire.

Another point of some importance is that neither the Japanese Government nor the Japanese delegation made the best use of the Lytton Commission's report. True, the report contains statements which, from a Japanese point of view, are not entirely pleasing. But, taken as a whole, it is a document which Japan could well have used to her advantage. Among other things, it states plainly that until China has established a reliable central government, nothing of importance can be done towards readjusting her relations with Japan or her position in Manchuria. Instead of taking the report as a whole in a friendly spirit, Japan seemed bent upon ferreting out mis-statements and erroneous judgments, some of which are of minor importance. In point of fact, she missed the wood for the trees.

On the other hand, neither the League Council, nor the Assembly, nor the Committee of Nineteen, between November, 1932 and February,

1933, was disposed to give Japan the fair hearing which her case and her standing as a State Member deserved.

In preparing its report to the Assembly, the Committee adopted *in toto* the recommendations of the Lytton Report, when it stated that "the settlement of the (Sino-Japanese) dispute must conform to the principles and conditions laid down by the (Lytton) Commission of Inquiry." In point of fact, however, the Committee of Nineteen wandered somewhat from those "principles and conditions," and was guided not so much by the facts presented in the Lytton report as by its own prejudices and preconceived notions. This may be arguable. But it is certain that the Committee in its Report ignored the recommendations of the Lytton Commission. The Assembly, governed perhaps by a species of mob psychology rather than by calm and independent thinking, swallowed whole the Committee's conclusions, without understanding what they really meant.

Attention should be drawn to the most essential of the "principles and conditions" laid down by



the Lytton Commission for the guidance of the settlement of the Sino-Japanese controversy.

They are :

1. "Recognition of Japan's interests in Manchuria."


2. "A restatement of the respective rights, interests and responsibilities of China and Japan in new treaties."

3. "A large measure of autonomy (for Manchuria) designed to meet its local conditions and special characteristics."

4. Organization of "an effective local gendarmerie force" for the maintenance of internal order in Manchuria, and "withdrawal of all armed forces," Chinese or Japanese, after such a gendarmerie force shall have been organized.

5. "Since the conditions enumerated above cannot be fulfilled without a strong central government in China, the final requisite for a satisfactory solution is temporary international co-operation in the internal reconstruction in China."

For all practical purposes, the thirty-two words contained in point (5) constitute the essence and the only important part of the Lytton report. As is evident in the wording of the fifth point, the Lytton Commission itself thinks it of little use to discuss the recognition of Japanese rights, the conclusion of Sino-Japanese treaties, the organization of a gendarmerie, the establishment of an autonomous Manchuria, the withdrawal of troops, etc., until and unless China shall have succeeded in establishing a united, stable, and efficient central government which is capable of observing laws and treaties and with which foreign governments may deal with confidence.



## CHAPTER IX

### GENEVA AND MANCHUKUO

AT the time when the Sino-Japanese controversy was raging along the shore of the Lake of Geneva, a raging and tearing propaganda was carried on in England in a section of the Press, and among many so-called "pacifists," against Sir John Simon because in the opinion of a certain school in England Sir John Simon "was too weak." I held no brief for Sir John as I knew he could well take care of himself; but I did write five paragraphs in the *London Daily Telegraph*, October 15th, 1932, in the leading article page under "London Day by Day" as follows:

"Sir John Simon by his handling of international affairs at Geneva, is preparing for himself a particularly worthy place in the annals of the League when these come to be

written. And this notwithstanding the hostile activities of some propagandists.

“ He is earning a reputation for never losing sight of the real conditions obtaining in any delicate situation, and makes his invariable starting point the removal, so far as possible, of the causes of hostility between delegations.

“ Only the more responsible of the world’s statesmen and diplomats who attend the League meetings are able fully to appreciate the efficacy of Sir John Simon’s methods. I have been assured by one or two of these that the British Foreign Secretary has done far more than the public can know towards establishing the peace of the world.

“ On the highest authority it can be asserted that only Sir John’s adroitness in handling the Japan-China situation, following Mr. Stimson’s Note in January, saved the world from another war.

“ An Italian statesman insisted to me that

when the time comes to review calmly questions of disputes in the Far East, and the general disarmament problem, our Foreign Secretary will be recognized as the bridge-maker of the present age."

In the circumstances, as I wrote later in a leading Tokio paper, "there was no alternative for Japan but to withdraw from the League. There is no doubt whatever that Japan was wronged and slighted by the small States Members of the League, as a result of their failure to understand conditions in the Far East. Had they been better informed they would not have talked about the Sino-Japanese conflict, either so long or so loud."

The small States, whether the Balkans or the South Americans represented on the Council and on the Committee of Nineteen, are quite willing to fight with their tongues, but not otherwise, so that all they contribute to the work of the League is words, words, phrases, phrases.

Even on the spot, the Lytton Commission were

faced with two nations whose languages they did not understand, and whose theory of international relationships was quite beyond their comprehension. When the Commission arrived in China, they were provided with a special train which belonged to a British company, a train of which the Chinese Government, whatever party it may have represented, had taken possession and for which it had not paid. The Chinese had the interior of the coaches upholstered in most expensive silks, and altogether treated the Commission like royalty. An English lady, a friend of the Chairman of the Commission, resident in China, entered one of the coaches where Lord Lytton and some of the other members of the Commission were seated and exclaimed: "Do you know that you are in a British carriage that has been taken over by the Chinese and not paid for?"

The members of the Lytton Commission and their staff, many of whom I know personally, are all human, and were much impressed by Chinese courtesy and consideration.

I was told by those same members, however, that when the Commission arrived in Manchuria they were treated as undesirable aliens, and this also made an impression on them. I was also told when I was in Manchuria that had it not been for the protection of the Japanese police, the Manchurian people would have lynched the Chinese assessor who accompanied the Commission, and the members of the Commission itself and their staff would have been mobbed. Moreover, I was assured on good authority that four hundred Manchurian bandits were on the look-out to kidnap, as it was put to me, "the whole bally lot." It was also added: "It is a pity that the bandits were unable to carry out their intentions as a good deal of trouble might have been avoided."

The best joke I heard about the Lytton Commission's visit to China, Japan and Manchuria was during their return journey from Shanghai to Europe. When the ship approached Hongkong, Lord Lytton asked the captain whether he would grant permission to the members of the Commission to be on the bridge to watch the entrance



THE CHIEF OF THE BANDITS WITH TWO OF HIS FOLLOWERS





into Hongkong Harbour. The captain, though an Italian, could easily pass by his looks and by his fluent English for a good old British sea-dog. He replied to Lord Lytton, in the presence of some of the other commissioners, that he would certainly be pleased to have them on the bridge; "But," asked the captain, "have you never seen Hongkong Harbour?" "No," replied the President of the Commission, "None of us have ever been in China except Mr. Mac (the U.S.A. member of the Commission)." "My goodness," exclaimed the captain, "and you are going to write a report on China after a three weeks' visit." "Why," he continued, "I have been coming to China for the last thirty years, and I wouldn't dare to give an opinion about China, let alone writing a report on the country."

Japan's decision to withdraw from the League of Nations was inevitable. This however does not imply that Japan has adopted an isolation policy. On the contrary, when announcing to the League her decision to withdraw, the Japanese Government published the Emperor's Rescript

concerning the decision which said that "By withdrawing from the League and embarking on a course of its own, our Empire does not mean that it will stand aloof in the Extreme Orient, nor that it will isolate itself thereby from the fraternity of nations. It is our desire to promote mutual confidence between our Empire and all other powers and to make known the justice of our cause throughout the world."

I may mention that I was in Tokio at the time when Japan left the League, and I can truthfully say that it was with reluctance that Japan decided on the step she took. From conversations that I had during my sojourn in Japan with people of all classes, I am satisfied that if the League is reconstructed as is now proposed, Japan may reconsider her decision and may again become, as she was in the past, one of the most useful Members of the League.

There is one thing that the Governments of post-War Europe have shown, and that is that they are incapable of solving or attempting to solve great international problems through the

medium of their chosen instrument, the League of Nations. Some of the small Powers, particularly the new upstart States which have grown up since the Versailles Treaty as mushrooms, and who have so far been unable to live in peace among themselves, have been insisting during the discussions at the League that the Great Powers should take action against Japan. I am certain that if the small States were asked to help Japan or China, either financially or otherwise, they would plead poverty and incapacity. At the same time, some of these States were busy sending arms and ammunitions as well as opium to the Far East as long as they were paid for both. China, as I pointed out already, was led to believe that she had the League in her pocket. So, too, the United States likewise did a great deal of harm in encouraging China in her attitude towards Japan. Stimson's Note to the Powers urging them not to recognize the new State of Manchuria has perhaps not had the effect which he hoped it would have, but it put a barrier between China and Japan. The British Government, through

its Secretary of State, Sir John Simon, did its best to build a bridge for China, but the influence of all the small Powers, by their votes and by prejudices, and often with an eye upon some third party or parties, or with an axe to grind, swept away all the efforts of British diplomacy.

After spending several months both in China and Japan, I am convinced that Japan has no other ambition in the Far East than the securing and maintenance of peace. Such an end would not be realizable so long as Manchuria is to be terrorized by the Chinese war lords. Japan should rather be thanked for having rid Manchuria of a regime which offended against every canon of liberty and civilization. The oppressed Manchurian people have been delivered from their tyrants.

That this was Japan's only object may be seen by the terms of the armistice and peace signed on May 31st, 1933, between the Japanese and Chinese at Tangku near Tientsin. Under the terms of this armistice, the Japanese forces stopped short their operations on the very threshold

of Peking and Tientsin at a time when the Chinese forces opposed to them were crushed beyond all powers of resistance. This alone is proof of the fact that Japan harbours no ambition of conquering Northern China. When everything was at her feet she was content to secure the positions which would allow of the peaceful development of the new State of Manchukuo.

It has been plainly stated in Tokio that it is Japan's intention to co-operate with all nations for the advance of the general welfare and prosperity of mankind. Although Japan is now outside the League, she has retained her membership of the International Labour Office, and it is to this aspect of the question that I should like to devote a few pages. Before doing so, however, let me say a few words on the question of the relations between Japan and Russia.

In thinking of Japanese problems in Eastern Asia, it should never be forgotten that she has opened her flank and her north in Manchuria to the incalculable power of Soviet Russia. This is not the place to attempt any estimate of the value

or permanence of the great Communist experiment at present being carried on over an area extending over the Niemen to the shores of the Yellow Sea. This book is concerned with realities, as the Japanese are concerned with realities. And the Japanese are far too clever to underrate a possible opening. The Japanese General Staff is fully aware of the fact that Soviet Russia is solidly entrenched, that the Red Army is practically trained and equipped, unlike the poor Imperial hordes which Japan managed with difficulty to get the better of in 1904; that the Red Army in Eastern Siberia possesses squadrons of bombing aeroplanes, perfectly capable of turning Japanese coast towns into shambles at twenty-four hours' notice; and finally, that that Red Army and the whole Far Eastern community of Soviet Russia is in charge of a man whom the Japanese authorities—no mean judges—regard as one of the greatest military intelligences of the age. General Blucher was for two years Military Attaché in Japan, and it is to be presumed knows everything there is to know about the organization of the

Japanese Army and its capacity for an offensive in Eastern Siberia. The Japanese General Staff have the highest opinion of General Blucher and are not likely to give way to any sentimental ideas of "clearing out the Red rabble," such as is so often advocated in our own cheap Press. Believe me, Japan has nothing to gain by antagonizing Soviet Russia, and nobody knows it better than the extremely capable minds who direct the Japanese Great General Staff. It is possible that, as some popular journalists assert, war between Japan and Russia in the Far East is inevitable. If it is, it will not be Japan who will go out of her way to provoke it, and whether or no we approve of the whole confused experiment, it is easy to see that neither will Soviet Russia go out of her way to provoke Japan. Taking it by and large, we may say that unless the parties concerned are driven to hostilities by forces outside their control or by the machinations of other Powers hostile to Japan, there will be no Russo-Japanese war in the near future. If this is so, and I believe it is, I should like to appeal to my countrymen not



to be led astray by the bellicose imaginings of the British press barons into steering for a war between Russia and Japan which will be engineered for the profit of neither party at the instigation of Japan's enemies (not China), and for the advantage of the international armaments ring.

And yet perhaps things are not quite so bad as might be imagined. The very strength of Soviet Russia in Eastern Siberia is, as the Tokio correspondent of *The Times* recently pointed out, a safeguard for peace rather a threat of war. While Japan, as is only natural, is increasing her defence and her strategic railways in Manchukuo, she is not unaware of the threat to her communications involved in the port and fortress of Vladivostock. She is not unaware that Vladivostock is the base for air squadrons which could in a few hours scatter bombs over certain towns of Manchukuo and Korea, but could not reach Tokio. The reason why the Russians could never reach Tokio is not for me to divulge. True, Japan could destroy Vladivostock, but as *The Times* correspondent points out, "what is a remote sea-

port compared with the cities in which Japanese administration and industry are concentrated ? ”

Most experienced foreign observers in Japan do not believe that war is inevitable in this year of grace 1934, as they believed it to be inevitable in 1900. The position is entirely different : the Japanese have acquired in Manchuria all the positions which they consider essential to their progress and security ; they have acquired these positions without obstruction from Russia. Soviet Russia is not afraid of a Japanese offensive, although it may from time to time pretend to be so. It should not be beyond the wit of the statesmen in Tokio and Moscow to adjust the position in a manner satisfactory to both parties without the hideous expenditure and risk of a first-class war, which, in the view of both parties, Eastern Siberia is not worth.

## CHAPTER X

### JAPAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE

UNLIKE Germany, but like Argentina, Brazil and Spain, Japan decided when she left the League, that her departure must not mean a moment's interruption of her precious collaboration with the International Labour Office, and other humanitarian activities, including disarmament.

Japan thus indicated her profound sympathy with the aims of the International Labour Office, and her intention to see to it that every possible improvement was made in conditions of labour in her own country—at the same time as labour conditions were being improved throughout the world. She was also thoroughly alive to the valuable nature of her contribution to the work of the staff of the International Labour Office,

where highly respected Japanese officials holding important positions contribute invaluable information to the Office about conditions in the Far East.

Japan has much to gain from her collaboration with the International Labour Office, just as the International Labour Office can benefit greatly from Japan's membership. Japan has rendered great service to the I.L.O., both in extending its influence in the Far East and in furthering its efforts for the establishment of a system of that world-wide social justice which is the foundation stone of social and international peace.

On its side the I.L.O. has endeavoured to render service to Japan, as indeed to all its State members. In 1929 the late Albert Thomas, its then Director, whose constant pre-occupation was to see the I.L.O. exercise a universal influence, visited Japan to study on the spot her industrial situation, to get a glimpse of living and working conditions in Japan, to obtain some impression of the development of Japanese trade unionism and to understand better the special reasons for the provision of exceptions to

the Washington Conventions in the case of Japan. Albert Thomas, whom posterity will honour even more than did his contemporaries, understood to the full not only the importance of understanding difference between continents, but also of understanding conditions in the various countries themselves, especially those in the Far East. Following the principles laid down by Thomas, the I.L.O. appreciates that it must have a sound knowledge of the position in countries like Japan if it is to exercise a really universal influence.

In a recent publication entitled "Industrial Labour in Japan" the I.L.O. thus emphasized Japan's difficulties and her determination to industrialize the country.

"The difficulties of a densely populated country having a limited land area and faced with the prospect of a shortage of food supply and insufficient outlets for emigration have led the Japanese to the conclusion that Japan must become more and more industrialized, and this idea has found popular expression in the phrase *Sangyo Rik-koku* (literally,

‘founding the nation upon industry’). Sangyo Rik-koku is not only a traditional policy of every Government, whatever party may be in power, but it has come to embody a national determination common to every thinking Japanese. To bring about a definite increase in the country’s industrial capacity is the task which the Government and people of Japan have set before them.”

Moreover, the International Labour Office laid stress on the progress resulting from Japan’s firm intention to develop her resources.

“Japan’s firm and considered will to develop has dominated the history of the last seventy years. Up to the third quarter of the nineteenth century Japan was a self-contained feudal State, living within jealously guarded coasts a life unchanged by external contacts and evolving only within the framework of its ancient traditions and institutions. Fifty years later it had been transformed by the intelligence and enterprise of its rulers and people

into a modern World Power. The extent of this transformation in the industrial sphere has been shown in this study by the statistics of growth of the industrial population, of capital, of production, of world trade, of shipping, etc. It is perhaps even more strikingly illustrated by the fact that when, in 1919, it became necessary to determine the eight States of chief industrial importance entitled to permanent representation on the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, Japan was found to be one of these eight States."

In this volume also the International Labour Office referred to the continuous progress made in the passage of labour legislation in Japan, and expressed appreciation of the ready acceptance of I.L.O. influence in this direction.

"Not only have the Conventions ratified by Japan exercised a formative influence on her labour legislation, but provisions of Conventions which it has not yet been considered

possible to ratify have been embodied in Japanese law. The field of application of the factory legislation has been progressively widened, and the detailed provisions of both factory and mining laws and regulations have been elaborated and extended. The machinery for finding employment for workers both on land and sea has been revised by legislation in accordance with the International Convention ratified by Japan. In addition, an industrial conciliation procedure has been created by legislation, and a health insurance system is working under the provisions of the Health Insurance Act."

The Office further indicated that Japanese legislation had gone furthest in the direction of the standards laid down in International Labour Conventions in regard to the protection of women and juvenile workers.

"In accordance with the minimum age provisions of the relevant Conventions, which Japan has ratified, the minimum age for



admission to employment at sea is fourteen years ; it is also fourteen years on land in the undertakings covered by the factory legislation subject to the possibility of employing children of twelve years of age who have passed through the full elementary school courses. Japan has also ratified and applied the other maritime Conventions dealing with the juvenile labour. As regards the night work of women and young persons employed in industry, the law is now in accord with the Conventions save in respect of its field of application and certain possibilities of making exceptions. The provisions of the law which deal with the protection of women in childbirth have also been brought near to the standard of the Washington Maternity Convention. There would seem, therefore, to be every ground for the hope that, within the next few years, Japan will have been able to ratify all the International Conventions relating to women and juvenile workers. Finally, it should be mentioned

that Japan has taken action in a matter which has not been the subject of international legislation, and has decreed the prohibition, after September, 1933, of the employment of women and young persons under sixteen years of age underground in mines, subject to the possibility of exceptions for coal mines where the seams are thin."

Again, during the debate in the 1933 Session of the International Labour Conference on the question of the intensification of the competition between the old advanced industrial countries and some of the newer industrial countries overseas, as well as between some of the overseas countries themselves, the Director of the International Labour Office, Mr. Harold Butler, who succeeded the late M. Thomas in 1932, emphasized the importance of obtaining first-hand and complete information as to the real conditions of competition in the East. He welcomed the idea of convening an Asiatic Conference and mentioned that the International Labour Office had already made a beginning in the work of getting accurate information

in publishing the volume to which reference has previously been made in these pages, and which has aroused great interest in numerous countries.

Mr. Harold Butler went on to say :

“ We propose to follow that volume by others dealing with other Asiatic countries, but I am sure that at the present time a great many statements are made and a good deal of controversy is carried on on insecure foundations without a complete realization of all the facts of the situation. In that connection I was very much struck by some of the figures which Mr. Watanabe (the Japanese delegate) adduced. As he pointed out, the exchange situation as it is to-day has created an abnormal position, and it would no doubt be a mistake to assume that the conditions which now exist are permanent. Again, he pointed out that this whole question is intimately bound up with the whole problem of tariffs and international exchanges, and I believe that account has to be taken of all those things before we can see this problem in its proper perspective.

“ All I would say is that I regard this as one of the most important problems with which the Office is called upon to deal, and that we shall do our best to try to obtain full information and to present it as impartially and objectively as we possibly can.”

More recently still, Mr. Harold Butler, in the course of a lecture tour in Lancashire, referred sympathetically to Japan's difficulties and to her accomplishments in the field of labour legislation. Addressing the Manchester Rotary Club, he discussed the problem of establishing international labour conditions, with special reference to the situation in Japan and the Far East. He pointed to the development of mechanization and rationalization in Japan and to the big problems created in Japan—as in India and China—by the advent of machinery :

“ Before the war,” he said, “ industry was in the hands of a few highly industrialized countries in Europe and America. That position is now entirely changed, partly

through the war and partly through the introduction of machinery, which makes highly skilled workers far less necessary. Consequently you get industry spreading not only in the Eastern countries of Europe, but in India, Japan and China. In these countries the introduction of minimum standards is more necessary than elsewhere. But the introduction of European standards to them represents a far bigger jump than it does in any Western country.

He then referred to the progress that had been made both in Europe and in the East in the matter of labour legislation.

“In Japan the employment of children under fourteen and the employment of women on night work in factories had been forbidden, the beginning of workmen's compensation set up, and a limitation of hours secured.”

Many other instances could be adduced of the intensity and practical value of Japan's collaboration with the International Labour Office. The

results of that collaboration are apparent to all intelligent observers in the increasing modernization and efficient working of Japan's industrial code, and in the wealth of detailed statistical information which the I.L.O. has been enabled to collect and publish concerning social conditions in modern Japan. I would like, however, to conclude this chapter with a comparison, which may not be without a lesson for the impartial observer, between the methods adopted by Japan on being forced to withdraw from the League, and those adopted by another Power which has recently seen fit, without compulsion of any sort, to repudiate its international obligations. The comparison is, to say the least, instructive.

When I was in Tokio at the time the Emperor's Rescript concerning Japan's decision to withdraw from the League was issued, there was no jubilation and no fireworks. The aged but wise statesman, Admiral Viscount Makoto Saito, Prime Minister, issued a dignified statement explaining how Japan was obliged to leave the League of Nations, and added: "Japan would continue to

co-operate with international movements aiming at the welfare and happiness of mankind, in accordance with her tradition to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and the advancement of culture." The public in Japan, everywhere, bemoaned the fact that they were obliged to leave the League, for they realized that although in their view it had blundered in the Sino-Japanese conflict, the League had done wonders for humanity in many spheres of activity. Wherever I lectured in Japan, Korea and Manchuria on the work of the League, everywhere my audience was most sympathetic. Four months after Japan's withdrawal from the League, I was leaving for Europe and was appointed correspondent to the *Japan Times* of Tokio, a paper which is the semi-official organ of the Government. The last thing I was told before leaving Tokio was, "Remember Japan is no enemy of the League."

Now let us look at another country, Germany, which has also left the League. I cannot do better than quote the *London Times* of February

12th, 1934, also about four months after Germany left the League. The Munich correspondent of *The Times*, in describing the first Munich Carnival procession under Nazi auspices which took place in that city, wrote as follows :

“ One of the chief sections consisted of an elaborate burlesque of the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference. This was headed by a figure representing Peace mounted on an enormous tank, and immediately followed by ‘ defenceless France ’ and ‘ re-armed Germany.’ The former group consisted of tanks, heavy guns, and French colonial troops armed to the teeth, while the latter was made up of German youths wearing paper cocked hats, armed with sticks and wooden guns and trailing behind them an antiquated piece of light artillery which discharged volley after volley of confetti. Various other groups designed to ridicule the League of Nations included a funeral procession bearing five coffins inscribed respectively ‘ The Last



Weapon,' 'The Last Soldier,' 'The Last Penny,' 'The Last Hope,' and finally 'Versailles.'

"A car escorted by heavily-armed French coloured troops was surmounted by an iron cage in which the rustic figure of the German Michael (the symbol of the German nation) languished in chains. This was accompanied by a long banner inscribed, 'Michael, are you going back to Geneva?' This question failed to invoke any great display of enthusiasm from the spectators, even when a member of the procession shouted out to them, 'The League of Nations is finished. Let us join the army.' Comparison between the two countries, in this case, is significant. On the one hand, as regards Japan, there is dignity, and on the other is degradation, and a total lack of that courtesy which has been for centuries, and still remains, the essential ingredient of civilization.

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## CHAPTER XI

### A SHORT STATEMENT OF JAPAN'S CASE

I HAVE indicated in a previous chapter that, in my view, in the prolonged controversy between Japan and the League which ended in the adoption by the Assembly, in February, 1933, of the Report of the Committee of Nineteen, and the withdrawal of the Japanese delegation from the Assembly, there are faults on both sides. In that chapter I dealt with details of the actual controversy as it came to a head in Geneva, and endeavoured, while being fair to both sides, to underline the points in Japan's case, not so much as against the Lytton Commission, but as against the Committee of Nineteen.

In this chapter I should like as briefly as possible to sketch what I consider to be the background of

Japan's case and the main historical events which led up to the disaster of 1933.

The whole business may be said to begin with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. In this case China refused to undertake jointly with Japan the necessary administrative and financial reforms in Korea. Japan, on the other hand, could not afford to see a chaotic Korea in the hands of an unreformed China. Here, too, it may be seen how history repeats itself. Just as Japan has now been obliged to safeguard her true interests and the safety of her nationals in Manchukuo against the Chinese War Lords, so in 1894 she had to protect Korea against the administrative incompetence of the great Imperial Mandarins.

Everyone knows what happened. Japan, after a victorious struggle, was compelled by Russia, Germany and France to restore the part of the Liaotung Peninsula ceded to her by China. Japan, being unable to face the three Great Powers, at once yielded, but from that moment war with Russia became sooner or later inevitable.

Even the Imperial Russian Government succeeded in seeing this, and concluded a secret Treaty of Alliance in May, 1896, with the famous Li Hung-chang. As a result of this Treaty, which was not divulged until the Washington Conference in 1921, and as a result of the Railway Convention of 1898, Russia built the Chinese Eastern Railway and the branch line from Harbin to Port Arthur in the Kwantung Peninsula.

At the turn of the century everything seemed to point to the fact that the Great Powers of Europe were contemplating a partition of the Chinese Empire. The Americans protested, with little avail. A better form of protest, perhaps, was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, which threw the weight of Great Britain upon Japan's side in case she should be attacked by more than one Power. Without this Treaty, which was not a secret Treaty but an open Convention, the Japanese would probably have been unable to prevent, as they did prevent, the partition of China. As it was, Japan fought Russia single-handed, and at the cost of 100,000

lives saved China from spoliation and partition. During the war, however, China rendered clandestine help to Russia under the terms of the Secret Alliance of 1896. Japan's gains in the war comprised the Kwantung Peninsula, including Port Arthur, and part of the Liaotung Peninsula, which had been reft from her by the Powers in 1895.

Unfortunately China was not grateful for the efforts made by Japan. It is not denied that Japan obtained a certain portion of former Chinese territory as a result of the war with Russia ; but remember that this territory had been previously formally ceded to Japan by China after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. The concessions which Japan obtained by the Treaty of Portsmouth were taken almost entirely from Russia, who was thus justly punished for her aggressive policy. China's attitude, however, continued to be anti-Japanese, and in the years between 1905 and the outbreak of the World War, she made several attempts to embroil Japan both with Great Britain and with the United States.

To such an extent was this policy pursued that in 1915 Japan presented to China a series of requests couched in severe language which are generally known as the "Twenty-one Demands," which still remain the chief cause of quarrel between the two countries. China maintained that her acceptance of these Demands was obtained by *force majeure* and Japan that there was no *force majeure*, and furthermore that provisions to which China originally objected had been deleted from the Demands. In actual fact when Japan now talks of her Treaty rights in Manchuria and her relations with China she is referring to the Twenty-one Demands. It is, therefore, as well to know clearly their main provisions. They may be summarized as follows :—

1. The lease of Dairen and Port Arthur, which was to have expired in 1923, was extended up to 1997 (or 99 years from 1898, when the lease was first obtained from Russia.


2. The *term* of the South Manchurian Railway and the mines appurtenant thereto, which might have been taken over by China

in 1938, was extended to 2002 (or 99 years from 1903 when the railway was opened to traffic by Russia).

3. The *term* of the Antung-Mukden line (a section of the South Manchurian Railway), which was to have expired in 1923, was extended to 2007 (or 99 years from 1908).

4. The Japanese, as well as the nationals of other countries, were to have the right to lease land for agricultural and commercial purposes.

Of all these points the main issue is, of course, Manchuria, and the heart of Manchuria is the South Manchurian Railway, which is a very large concern indeed, a semi-official corporation organized to improve and operate the railways ceded to Japan by Russia under the Treaty of Portsmouth. This cession was explicitly approved by China. The shares of the Corporation are owned by the Japanese and Chinese Governments and by their nationals, and the Japanese Government has handed over as part of the capital invested in the Corporation the



INTERIOR OF A JAPANESE RAILWAY DINING CAR





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railways and coal mines ceded to her by Russia under the same Treaty.

The Japanese Government and people have subscribed in an overwhelming degree to the railway, and it is estimated that the total Japanese investments in Manchuria are well over 2,147,000,000 yen. The South Manchurian Railway, besides transport, deals in coal mines, iron works, locomotive works, wharves and warehouses. It also maintains hospitals and schools and undertakes various other social works for the benefit of China and Japan within the railway zone. It is without doubt the largest organization of its kind in the Far East. It will be seen, therefore, that Japan's treaty interests in Manchuria are of paramount importance.

Similarly, Japan's lease of Dairen and Port Arthur, which was extended up to 1997, is of paramount importance to Japan because it provides the South Manchurian Railway with the necessary base and sea outlet. The fortifications of Port Arthur have long since been demolished and the harbour is not now regarded by Japan as

a naval base, although it serves as a shelter for naval craft employed for police duties. Both harbours are, however, essential for economic reasons.

In pursuance of her policy of obstructionism to Japan, China has repeatedly tried to build lines parallel and competitive to the South Manchurian Railway. Such attempts are violations of China's undertaking, made in December, 1905, not to construct any branch line in the neighbourhood of, or parallel to, the South Manchurian Railway, or any branch line likely to be prejudicial to the interests of the railway. In spite of this, in the last few years the Chinese War-Lords have built about 750 miles of railway, most or all of which is prejudicial to the exploitation of the South Manchurian Railway. Moreover, the parallel lines are essentially military in their conception and are maintained chiefly for strategic purposes. It is clear that from the economic point of view there is no use for them.

It would be possible to multiply unendingly the details of the manner in which China has evaded

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her Treaty obligations in Manchuria to the great detriment of Japanese interests, and to the danger of the lives of Japanese nationals working peacefully in Manchuria. Be it remembered that Japan has no wish to annex Manchuria, which is proved by the fact that she did not do so when she could have. It is, however, essential to Japan that Manchuria, with its thirty million Manchurians and some two million Japanese and foreign residents, should be allowed to develop its natural riches undisturbed by the depredations of the Chinese War-Lords, who are for ever raising the issue that Manchuria "belongs to China." This is entirely beside the point. It would be historically more correct to say that China belonged to Manchukuo since it was the Manchu dynasty which ultimately established itself on the throne of China and which has now, in the person of the new Emperor of Manchukuo, recovered its ancient territory of Manchuria. The truth is that it is now almost impossible to talk about the Sino-Japanese issue, because there are not two parties to this issue, but half a dozen or

more, namely, Japan and Manchuria on the one side and, on the other side, a series of disparate organizations in a greater or less state of disintegration or banditry, together with Communist zones of influence, and all at variance one with another. When one looks at an ordinary map of China one gets an illusory vision of a large single country coloured the same on the map and marked "China." Any map, however, which shows the number of the various zones of influence, of the various "Governments," armies, Communist areas, bandit-infested areas, etc., will go far to dispel any such illusion.

No, Japan has a first rate case. What she can fairly be charged with, I think, is having neglected until too late to put that case at Geneva.

The people of Manchuria, who are a very real people indeed, and are as distinct from the people of the Yangtse valley and Canton as are the peoples of South and North India, have manifested a determined and deliberate desire for peace in their own country and for self-determination apart from the Chinese War-Lords. Many of

the most prominent Chinese have encouraged the movement because they hoped not only for the restoration of the old dynasty in Manchuria, but also for the re-establishment of peace and order, at least on the northern borders of China.

I firmly believe that the establishment of Manchukuo is the beginning of a final peaceful settlement and of perhaps unhampered economic action in all this region. Japan does not want to colonize Manchukuo. Speaking generally, its climate is not suitable for her nationals. They could not live there in any large numbers even if they would. But what she does want is what a great many of the best Chinese want too, namely, the possibility of peaceful trade development.

It is particularly to Englishmen that I would address this case. Japan has always valued British friendship. She was keenly alive to the immense political value to her of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, since without it she could never have taken arms against Russian aggression in Manchuria and the Far East in

general. She regretted deeply the denunciation by us of that alliance in 1921, but she loyally accepted a decision, the motives of which she could not but have seriously regretted, and as a nation she would be bitterly hurt if the British people were not to make some attempt at least to understand the strength of her case in Manchuria.

## CHAPTER XII

### JAPAN AND ENGLISH CIVILIZATION AND STATECRAFT

**D**URING my stay in Tokio I had the privilege of meeting several of the elder statesmen, including the Prime Minister, Admiral Saito, the Finance Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and others. It was my privilege to discuss with them international affairs, and I may say that I found them, one and all, patriots of the highest order—high-souled, courteous and well informed.


I gathered that these elder statesmen govern Japan for the people, but they hope that in due time it will be possible for the Government of Japan to become a Government by the people.

Japan, they assured me, is doing exactly what Great Britain was privileged to do throughout her Empire a century ago; converting desert places into gardens. The valleys are rich with



golden grain, the terraced hills with clinging fruit and tea plantations. In Formosa, Korea, and now in Manchuria, the Japanese have built cities and towns, with fine streets, squares and parks. They have erected temples, theatres, schools, colleges and universities. They have founded nursing homes, hospitals and scientific medical colleges. Railways have penetrated into the very heart of the country, while sea harbours, canals and the principal motor roads are as well built as any in England. Japan in fact is perhaps one of the most fertile and flourishing countries in the world. Since the terrible earthquake of September, 1923, Tokio, Yokohama and other towns have become wealthy cities with schools, colleges, universities and other fine public buildings established at great cost. The whole island, or rather all the islands of Japan, abound in springs, rivers and lakes; the country possesses a rare and delightful climate and scenery of great variety and beauty.

During the weeks and months that I travelled over the country by rail, motor-car, on foot or



TOKYO SHIMONOSKI EXPRESS DRAWN BY AN ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVE



by boat, I never found it dull or monotonous, but entrancingly varied in aspect: plains and valleys, gentle slopes and terraced hills, deep ravines and bold peaks, naturally fortified eminences and giant mountains. Although the land under cultivation is barely sufficient to supply the daily rice of the population, the soil is naturally so fertile that, with forced and skilful husbandry, it is brought to the highest state of productivity. Japan does indeed possess features of richness and beauty rarely, if ever, combined in so small a country anywhere in the world.

All the towns and villages, as I pointed out, are connected by railways, canals or other great thoroughfares, which are thronged with trading activities. The main industries of the country, apart from its manufactures, are agriculture and fisheries. The cotton mills and other factories, as already pointed out in another chapter, are in a most flourishing condition, being managed with energy and skill by a people that knows well not only how to use to advantage the resources of their beloved country, but ruthlessly to scrap old

machinery and methods, and to follow where science and organization point.

As for education, it is thoroughly up to date, and no expense has been spared in building fine schools and universities. Western teachers are employed in the colleges and universities to teach English, for Japan realizes that English is the language of international commerce.

The army, as is well known, is equipped in first class style to the last button, while the elder officers of the Navy have had their training on English lines. Japan's strength, one may say, lies in her patriotism, and in national emergencies the enthusiastic loyalty of the Japanese to their Emperor almost approaches adoration.

Although the majority of the people are peasants, who have little chance of coming into contact with the outside world, the Japanese as a whole can be faithfully described as an intelligent, industrious and enterprising people, possessed of vigorous minds and healthy bodies, as healthy as their own climate and as cheerful as their own skies.

I think it is only fair to mention that whenever I met members of the Japanese Government, they seldom failed to express regret at the fact that Great Britain's alliance with Japan came to an end. Nevertheless the friendly feeling towards England and English people is always manifest.

I have said that I have wandered through Japan, and I must add that I also spent some time in Korea to see what the Japanese have accomplished there. I travelled by train through Korea in the company of an American missionary who had been absent from the country for four years. He exclaimed with astonishment in looking out from the window at the country we were passing through.

"Those hill plantations that you see," he remarked, "were, only four years ago, barren rocks."

What brought about this transformation? The Japanese terraced those hills, covered them with rich soil brought up from below, and then planted them with trees.

The roads for motoring are now as good as

those running from London to Brighton; the towns and villages have good housing accommodation, and the land everywhere is cultivated to a high pitch of productiveness.

The younger generation of Koreans receive a good education, and if they are fit they can be candidates for any governmental post. The elder Korean natives still remain as they were of old, lazy, idle, and not at all inclined toward progress, but those of the younger generation have been trained to work and to be self-reliant and self-respecting.

Japan is certainly not making any fortune out of Korea, for the Korean budget has always to be supplemented by funds from Japan. I have known of propaganda being carried on for the independence of Korea, at Geneva, by Koreans hailing from the United States of America, but in Korea itself I heard no cry for independence. In fact, the Japanese find their fellow subjects, the Koreans, a burden on the labour market, for they cross over to Japan in their thousands and, their standard of living being very low, they supply

cheap labour and give rise to a good deal of unemployment amongst the Japanese workers. They are subject to no immigration restrictions, since they are Japanese subjects. In this respect Japan is more charitable towards the Koreans than are Australia and the other British Dominions towards their fellow British subjects.

I do not want it to be thought that I am trying to make out the Japanese to be saints. Such is not at all my intention, but I may mention in this connection one incident. While in Tokio I noticed a number of young American women, newly arrived. These young women were advertising as teachers of English, typists, stenographers, etc. I made the acquaintance of a number of these young ladies and asked them what had brought them to Japan. They told me that most of them were school teachers in America and could not get their salaries paid, and also many of them had been discharged. So they thought they would try their chances in Japan, and there they were, teaching American, giving lessons to Japanese children, or working in offices




as correspondents in English. They did not receive high pay. They told me they were getting one yen an hour for teaching, which is about one shilling and twopence. If they gave eight hours' lessons a day they could manage to live in comfort. Of course a yen in Japan is worth about two shillings. When I was speaking with the Minister of Labour I asked him if in Japan there was no law preventing aliens from entering the country for the purpose of earning their living. He told me there certainly was.

"What," I said, "about Americans coming over in such numbers, particularly young women teachers, etc.?"

"Well," he replied with a smile, "you know what the Bible says: When thine enemy hungers, feed him, when he thirsts give him to drink. True, the Americans passed a law against our people settling in their country, but although we are a heathen nation we have the Christian spirit!"

The same Minister said to me: "We are taking as model your great British Empire. Manchukuo," he told me, 'is for all practical purposes



THE INSITUATION CEREMONY OF THE NEW JERSEY GOVERNOR CHIEF OF CHANG HAI LONG



an independent State under Japanese protection. All the Ministers are Manchus, and one day, when they have a sufficiently organized army for their own defence, we shall withdraw our troops. We are doing in Manchukuo exactly what your people have done in Egypt and elsewhere; we are protecting persons and property and creating peace and prosperity."

The people of Manchukuo, while I was there, certainly did not display any anti-Japanese feeling. On the contrary, everywhere I found the people at work, tilling the ground, or engaged in building roads and railways, and busy with their daily occupations.

At Jehol I was present at the inauguration of the new Governor of the province of Jehol, a former brigand; in other words, one of the War Lords who had been fighting all his life against the so-called Republic of China. He was always a Monarchist and an adherent of the boy Emperor, and never forgave the Chinese for their treatment of this boy, who has now become ruler of Manchukuo. I was the only correspondent

present at the ceremony of inauguration. I had as interpreter Mr. J. Duthie, a New Zealand missionary who has been in Jehol for over a quarter of a century. In his speech the new Governor, addressing the troops who were on parade, impressed upon them the necessity of obedience and right living, and finished up by telling them that there must be no more opium smoking in the army. And he added: "If any man cannot break himself of the habit of opium smoking, let him be brought to me and I will cure him."

The missionary and his wife told me that the day before the Japanese entered Jehol the inhabitants of the town rushed to the Mission premises, bringing their valuables and their virgins with them for safety. The missionaries told the people not to get into a panic, but to go back to their homes, taking their valuables and their virgins with them; that the Japanese were not barbarians and were not going to harm them. The native Christians obeyed, and returned to their homes, but the others pleaded to be allowed

to remain within the precincts of the Mission, which is surrounded by a high wall, and nothing would persuade them to leave the place.

The following day the Japanese arrived. There were first two armoured motor-cars which pulled up, strange to say, just in front of the Mission because of the sight of the Union Jack flying from a tree. The officers inquired of the missionaries when the War Lord of Jehol had left, and were told he had taken his departure two days before, whereupon from one of the motor vans, which seems to have been equipped with wireless, a message was sent to some of the air bombers to try to arrest the fugitive. Two bombers managed to locate the caravan and dropped a few bombs, but so far as is known only one of the concubines of the War Lord was killed. He himself, his wives, his army, and the great cart-loads of sacks of silver dollars, opium, heroin and other drugs which had been manufactured in Jehol got clear away.

Shortly after the two armoured cars there arrived other military equipment and vehicles,

one being a huge motor lorry containing hand-bills printed in Chinese, and little Japanese flags, which were freely distributed amongst the crowd. These hand-bills stated that the Japanese army had come to rescue the people from their tyrants and enable them to live in peace and happiness ; that the Japanese were going to protect the people against abuses and that they need not fear, as only good would come to them. Immediately posters to that effect appeared on the walls, depicting the departure of their oppressors the War Lords and the arrival of their saviours the Japanese. Like magic, the whole city of Jehol was exhibiting the Japanese and Manchu flags and, as one of the Belgian missionaries remarked to me, the people must have had these flags already hidden.

Then another caravan arrived of several hundred Geisha girls, with their mattresses and bedding. These Geisha girls were immediately placed in different houses of the city and the troops who followed were ordered under no circumstances to have anything to do with the native families,

being told at the same time that their houses of amusement were provided for them. The Chinese who had hidden away and locked up their wives and daughters to keep them out of harm's way, very soon released them, and the very next day the daily life of the city was being carried on as if nothing had happened, except that trade was brisker.

I was an eyewitness of the behaviour of the Japanese troops beyond the Great Wall, when I entered the walled city of Miyun only a short distance from Peking, with the 8th Division of the Japanese Army. There was, of course, no opposition, but the people of Miyun received the troops, not as conquerors, but as deliverers. They came out with baskets of eggs, ice-cream and cold drinks, and did a roaring trade. I had not my camera with me at the time, but I saw many amusing scenes. A Japanese soldier, bargaining over the price of eggs, could not make himself understood or understand the language of the Chinese seller. He took out a handful of coins and offered a number to the Chinaman. The



latter shook his head. Finally the Japanese soldier lost patience and was going off, whereupon the egg merchant caught hold of him and pulled him back and asked him to let him see the money. He then picked out two coins from the five or six offered to him and handed the soldier six eggs. The explanation is that the Japanese soldier had offered too much for the eggs and the Chinaman had insisted on selling them at the correct price.

General Sakamoto, Commander of the 8th Division, took up his quarters in one of the unpretentious houses, and when I visited him there was no furniture in the room except a wooden bunk and a small table on which he had his papers. All the army officers lived in the same way as the soldiers when at the front. In spite of all that had been published regarding alleged atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese army in Manchukuo, all the time I was with the army I never witnessed any cruelty on the part of the troops. Once I saw a party of about twenty recruits trying to give a thrashing to a Japanese civilian air pilot who, when taking off, nearly

ran them over as they were running across the track to get out of the dust. The pilot had stopped his machine and been foolish enough to open his door and call out, abusing the recruits for their stupidity in getting in his way, whereupon they made a rush upon the aeroplane and would certainly have done for the pilot had not the Commandant happened to come up.

I did not mention that I had reached Jehol by aeroplane from Chin Chu. If I had attempted to get there by road it would have taken me at least six days, for there is no proper road, nothing but a track, and that track was encumbered by thousands of carts and motor vans carrying provisions and munitions to the front. The country between Chin Chu and Jehol is very mountainous and rather bare. The tops of the mountains are flat, like tables, and between the mountains are narrow valleys. The grassy mountain tops afford pasture for sheep, but the only way to get the sheep to the pasture is by carrying them up the mountain. In the narrow valleys the brigands have their strongholds.

From Jehol to Miyun we had, of course, to cross the great Wall of China, and I took the opportunity of flying from Shanhaikuan, from the end of the Wall at the seashore, over the Kalga Pass, about 900 kilometres.

The Great Wall in parts is still in excellent preservation, but in others it is overgrown and hardly visible. The country all along seemed to be without habitation except for the miserable huts of the little villages and the tombs. In fact, there would seem to be no life at all. As is known, the Japanese have since withdrawn from Miyun and handed over the city to the Chinese, for they never really intended to enter Peking, although the Chinese were most anxious that they should, hoping that such action on the part of Japan would cause international complications and also help to remove the various foreign legations from Peking to Nanking.

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## CHAPTER XIII

### CHINA

CHINA is a land of surprises. The bulk of the Chinese people count by centuries, but in places which have come into contact with the Western world such as Shanghai, life proceeds at a feverish speed. I was assured by missionaries, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, that the people in remote parts of the country knew nothing about the Great World War until two or three years after it had started. Yet if one were to judge China by Shanghai, Canton or even Peking, one could not but be struck by the daily turmoil and struggle taking place. Yet I doubt whether the political and other activities of so-called young China really mean the advent of New China on the horizon. Shanghai, Nanking and Peking are not China, notwithstanding the fact that the Central Government is now at Nanking.

In order to understand China one must obtain a bird's-eye impression of its main geographical characteristics—its vastness, the extent of the globe which it covers, the proportion of the world's population which it comprises, without, for the present, being able to provide for them anything more than the very poorest subsistence, and—what at the outset strikes the European traveller, perhaps, most—its lack of communications.

The area of China is 4,278,352 square miles. It is larger than Europe ; it is even considerably larger than the United States of America, although they might not like you to mention this.

No census, as we understand this, has ever been taken ; but the most recent estimate, that of the Maritime Customs, made in 1925, places the population at 448,231,000—that is to say, between one-third and one-quarter of the total population of the globe.

Compared with either its area or its population, communications in China are almost non-existent ; there being to-day only about 4,227 miles of rail in China, compared with the 11,135 miles in use

in Japan, a country about one-twenty-eighth the size.

Size has much to do with China's problems. It is Japan's compactness, as much as anything else, which has enabled her to deal with the problems of her transition period, to cope with the foreigners in her midst and throw off the yoke of her unequal treaties in a comparatively short period.

Except by river, one cannot penetrate any appreciable distance into the interior of China, for there is neither rail nor road. It would be impossible to cross China from west to east by road in any sort of vehicle, though, no doubt, the journey could be made by mule-track. Even the long-promised road between the two important centres of Tientsin and Peking—a distance of only eighty-six miles—has but recently been completed.

There are two great rivers, the Yangtze and the Yellow Rivers, flowing eastward to the coast from far in the interior, the Yangtze from high up in the plateau of Tibet. But owing to difficulties

of navigation there is hardly any traffic on the Yellow River. On the Yangtze, on the other hand, ocean-going steamers can unload as far up as Hankow, nearly 600 miles from Shanghai on the coast.

In the modern sense of the word, China is thus developed only along the strip of territory running down the seaboard. The rest of the country is in a backward, primitive state, without rail or roads, cut off from the outside world, the mass of the people engaged in a terribly hard day-to-day struggle, to win a meagre livelihood from the soil.

China's stage of development and her lack of contact with other countries is further illustrated by her exceedingly small foreign trade per head of her population ; and this contrast of what is and what might be, these teeming millions, as yet so poor but still potential customers, has fired the commercial imagination of some of the great industrialists of the world (thought not, as much as one might expect, our own cotton magnates in Lancashire) with a vision of the enormous possibilities of China as a market.

Some people would have us say that China is not a country but a continent. That may be true of its size, but not of its peoples. Differences there may be between North, Centre and South, even to the extent that they are unable to understand each other's pronunciations when speaking a common written language. But their age-old civilization, their high culture, their wonderful art, their unique customs and certain strongly marked characteristics bind the great Chinese people into what appears to be superficially at least a homogeneous mass.

A short visit to China serves only to impress one with the vastness of the country. No one talks about democracy in China or such nonsense as that because one realizes that the people inhabiting the vast stretches of Sinkiang, Tibet or Szechwan, have no influence whatsoever.

During the course of my tour I had the opportunity of visiting most of the important centres and of penetrating into the interior and of meeting and discussing affairs with all sorts and conditions of people, Chinese as well as foreigners.



The difficulties of travel from one place to another impress on one not only the immensity of China, but her almost complete lack of development. But just as the country is undeveloped so her Government is unreal. People are apt to talk about the Government of China as if it was a Government such as we have in European countries, whose word was law throughout the length and breadth of China. It is true that there is a nominal central Government at Nanking, but to call it the Government of China is arrant humbug. It is really little more than a letter-box for the foreign ministers to drop their letters into, and in return it receives a share of the Chinese Maritime Customs revenue, and which, finding its way into the pockets of members of the Government and officials, great and small, finds its way back to British banks for safe keeping.

There are, however, certain organisms of the central Government which function throughout the whole of China and give the casual visitor the impression that there must be some central authority causing them to function. These

organisms are maintained intact, not by any Chinese authority, but by the foreigners who control them.

There are first of all the Chinese Maritime Customs, whose officials are nominally servants of the mythical Chinese Government, but who actually form a kind of civil service department under an Inspector-General of Customs appointed by the country which does the largest trade with China—at present still Great Britain, though Japan will, doubtless, soon claim this office, if the system lasts. Great Britain had the appointing of the present Inspector-General; but in practice he is responsible to the whole Diplomatic Corps in Peking. The Chinese Maritime Customs, which are staffed by all the nations doing trade with China, but have had a British Inspector-General since their establishment in 1863, are kept under foreign control in order that the first call on the revenue of the customs, the chief source of Chinese revenue, may be payment of the interest on foreign loans, contracted with various rulers of China in the past.

In addition to the Maritime Customs, there is the Post Office which, while officially it has been returned to China, is still more or less a French organisation, which continues to function in a miraculously efficient way, even when all the provinces are fighting each other ; and to deliver letters from one side to the other when it is humanly possible.

The fact remains that all the leaders and members of the Nanking Government have their homes in the safe international settlement at Shanghai where they and their families and their fortunes are protected by European and Sikh police and by the numerous warships anchored in the Whang-poo river. For the same reason this explains why the first motor road was made between Shanghai and Nanking, so that in case of emergency members of the Nanking Government could quickly get into safety in the international settlement of Shanghai, just as in former days when Peking was the capital of China, the "outs" of Peking politics used to take refuge in the legation quarters at Peking or, as they call

it now, Peiping, whenever a war lord marched on Peking.

True, at Nanking at present, they are building Government offices, military, naval, a post office and so on, but it is sincerely to be hoped that the European powers will never agree to entrust the lives of their Ministers and their Legation staff, not to speak of their women and children, to the tender mercies of the Nanking authorities.

Even in 1933 there was still to be seen the sad remains of the massacre which took place at the British Consulate when some of our people were shot in cold blood and the Consulate looted. Furthermore, Nanking is built on a swamp and malaria and other fevers are prevalent, and until China is free from chaos and confusion, and until the Chinese people have decided whether they are to be governed from Nanking or elsewhere, and whether their country is to continue to be dominated by prosperous bandits who have assumed the rôle of military dictators, or whether even the Emperor Pu Yi will come back as the Emperor of Northern China—a possibility not to be

overlooked—the place for us to remain is Peking where the legations are protected by their own soldiers and their own wireless stations, and where they have provisions for at least six months in case of a siege. And, above all, the legation quarter is surrounded by a wall with iron gates and drawbridges, and inside the wall there are platforms for mounting heavy artillery and machine guns in case of need ; and in the present state of China this is as needful and necessary as it was in the days of the Boxer massacre, or in 1926 at Shanghai and Canton. At present the only solid construction at Nanking is the vast funeral mound and mausoleum in honour of Sun Yat Sen.

As a matter of fact, the bulk of moderate, sensible, shrewd-headed Chinese merchants have no desire for the British to evacuate or remove their troops or give up any more concessions. The following remarks, which were made to me when I was with the Chinese troops in March, 1933, by a Chinese contractor to the army, will illustrate better what I mean. I was lodging

then in one of the Chinese inns, and at night all those contractors used to meet and I was generally questioned about British politicians and British politics. I remember one Chinese merchant from Hankow asking me about the various British statesmen. One question was, "Who is the greater man, MacDougall or Simone?" "Is it true," asked another Chinaman, "that MacDougall is a converted Communist?" "Is Simone a friend of China or of Japan?" When I explained to them that Sir John Simon is a friend of both countries and that all he tries to do is to build a bridge for China, there was immediately a great call from those present mentioning the various places where bridges were mostly needed. The man from Hankow seemed to be very anxious to know about Sham-bo-lin. "When Chamberlain comes to China he better not come to Hankow. Hankow people kill Chamberlain." "Why," I asked, "do Hankow people not like Sir Austen Chamberlain. I know Sir Austen personally; he is a good man and a good friend of China." "Oh no," he replied, "Sham-bo-lin

no good friend. When Hankow was under protection King George, Hankow was prosperous, Hankow people plenty money, plenty business, and now after Sham-bo-lin took away British masters, everything became bad. No business, no money, nothing but Bolshies."

Actually the Nanking Government has not even an army on which it can rely for support. The enormous area of country which it pretends to rule has neither railways nor roads. The people are being ruled by tyranny and oppression and misery in every shape, and in hardly any country of the world is such abject poverty to be found. The Nanking Government are helpless, the Treasury is empty, and the army is rotten to the core. There is no feeling of security in China. One must not, therefore, speak of the Government of Nanking as if it were a real authority and counted in China. It does not, except that it is sometimes a useful dummy to send delegations to international conferences at Geneva and elsewhere and to conclude agreements which are not kept. Chinese government is one of the greatest

make-believes and humbugs of the situation in the Far East.

China still lives and leans upon her past, passionately attached to her traditions. The Chinese are on the whole lovable and helpless. China is the big child among the nations. She possesses a Mongolian genius, mysterious and, like the Celtic Irish, always bound nowhere under full sail.



## CHAPTER XIV

### CHINA'S TRIUMVIRATE

THERE is one particularly interesting feature. China, so far as it is ruled at all, is now governed by three sisters. Perhaps the ablest women it has been my privilege to meet. They are Mrs. Sun Yat Sen, widow of the late Dr. Sun Yat Sen, Mrs. Chiang Kai Shek, the wife of the Commander-in-Chief, and Mrs. H. H. Kung, the wife of the present Finance Minister; all three are members of the famous Soong family to which Mr. T. V. Soong belongs—recently Finance Minister and now Chairman of the Executive. I was particularly impressed by Mrs. Kung, who entertained me at their house in Shanghai and also showed me a good deal of kindness during my stay at Nanking. Mrs. Kung is not only a lady by birth, a lady by education, but a lady by the grace of God. All the Soong family are

Christians, not merely Christians in name but Christians in practice, and if they only had more support from the great masses of China I honestly believe that they would be able to save China. Whatever good exists in China at present it is due to these three noble sisters.

The Internationalists at Geneva, discredited in Europe, have tried to find a scope for their energies in the Far East and have not been too modest to take on the job of reorganizing China. About a dozen or so League officials have been appointed to various posts in China to advise and help the Chinese people, although whether the mess of Western Europe is a recommendation or not I will not express any view. It is, of course, quite true that really capable men with the experience of administration and a knowledge of the Far East could render great service to China, but most of the officials who have been appointed know nothing about China and emanate from mediocre countries like Poland and the Balkans which cannot govern themselves even as

well as China. Their main point in common seems to be that they are anti-British.

From what I was told by prominent Chinese in many parts they would welcome and indeed prefer British advisers, but apparently if they asked for British advisers in London the other Powers would tell Nanking that they must not do it.

The rôle which the British Minister has to play in China is very difficult indeed. Outwardly he must keep the semblance of a Minister accredited to an orderly government. Actually he is a minister accredited to a patchwork quilt of Tuchuns, military bandits, and other forms of semi-independent regimes. No Representative of His Majesty and the British Government has rendered more signal service to China and the British Empire than Sir Miles Lampson, our late Minister at Peking, and I am certain that Sir Alexander Cadogan, with a great record of service in charge of the League of Nations Department at the Foreign Office, will now likewise build up an outstanding record.

As to the future of China, especially so far as Great Britain is concerned, the most important question is the position of China as a market for our manufactured goods. As I said earlier, there is no country in the world where there is so much poverty and squalor. The standard of life of the Chinese is probably lower than that of any other country in the world. As was pointed out in an excellent book written by Colonel Malone in 1926, much of which is still very true, it is estimated that the average amount spent by a Chinese peasant's family in one year is only equivalent to £22, compared to £300 which would be spent by a similar farming family in the West. The story of the life of these Chinese peasants is the story of the life of the bulk of the Chinese people. It is a story of millions of agricultural workers toiling with their families from dawn to dusk with primitive implements to win a meagre livelihood from the soil, with little leisure, little if any education, probably for the most part illiterate and with no break in the monotony of their toil except perhaps at the Chinese New Year

festival or when one of the many disastrous floods sweeps away their homes, until at a premature age they go to join their ancestors.

As long as the standard of life of the Chinese people is so low they will continue to make a very small demand on the export trade of other countries. The old joke that if the Chinese could be persuaded to increase the skirt of their night-gowns by only one inch, much of our unemployment problem would quickly disappear, is not really a very great exaggeration. If the purchasing power of the Chinese people were increased by as little as one halfpenny per person per week it would mean an increase of about one million pounds per week, or fifty-two millions per year, much of which would be bound to take the form of a demand for increased manufactured goods from this country. Elsewhere I have referred to the misunderstanding in some quarters in England concerning British and Japanese trade relations with China and elsewhere. If Great Britain in general, and Lancashire in particular, approaches the subject on the lines I have indicated in

Chapter VII, the next decade will open tremendous possibilities for Britain in China.

Before I left China, interest which earlier had been devoted to the north-eastern part of China, had veered round to the south-west. The position which has developed there is singularly important for Great Britain, and Chinese and others with whom I discussed this matter earnestly hoped that the people at home would appreciate this. In Sinkiang the local population, which is largely Moslem, is thoroughly dissatisfied with the chaos and corruption which have ruled in Kashgar for so long. Sinkiang, of which Kashgar is the capital, borders on Tibet and the U.S.S.R., and the clash in Kashgar is inevitably a clash between England and the U.S.S.R. There is no doubt that Soviet intrigues have been noticeable in Sinkiang, and might become a menace to India through Tibet. It is certainly to the interests of Great Britain that the administration at Kashgar, whether Sinkiang is independent or a province of China, should be friendly to Great Britain. I heard also that the Soviet authorities were very

alarmed at the revolt which had taken place in Sinkiang against their puppets, because they feared firstly, that an independent Mohammedan Turkestan would lead to independence amongst the Moslem Turkestanis just across the Soviet frontier; this, apart from other considerations, would be a serious menace to the newly-constructed Turk-Sib railway. They make wild accusations that the revolt was financed by Japan and Britain. But, in fact, so I was informed, it was mainly a revolt against a regime of corruption which was too remote for any other authority to check. To corroborate this I need not do more than quote the well known Chinese paper *O Shih Pao*, published at Tientsin, which in its issue of February 4th, 1934, says that "whilst the Mohammedans are not ripe for self-government, *owing to the misrule of Chinese officials* they have developed a national consciousness."

I was present at Hsinking (Changchun), the new capital of Manchukuo, when a deputation of princes from Inner Mongolia paid a visit to the

present Emperor of Manchukuo. He addressed them and expressed his joy at seeing old friends of his dynasty and the hope that he would live to see the day when they will be united again in one people. The various princes present did not speak, but tears were in their eyes while the Emperor addressed them, and the next thing I saw was the princes fall on their faces and touching the ground with their foreheads. They left a message with the Emperor that they were returning to their country to tell their people that "our Emperor is again on the throne."

Not less interesting and important to Great Britain is the situation which has arisen in Tibet. As a result of the death of the Dalai Lama, His Holiness Ngawang Lossang Thusten Gyatsho, who died on December 17th at the age of sixty, and was the senior of the joint pontiffs of Tibet. With the Panchen Lama he shared the temporal power of Tibet.

When visiting one of the lama monasteries in the north, I met the Panchen Lama and had a



long conversation with him through an interpreter. At that time, of course, the Dalai Lama was still alive, but from what I gathered the Panchen Lama thought that Tibet should become a province of China. There is no doubt that he had been got at by the Nanking Government, who had made him a member of a Committee with the high-sounding name of "Committee of Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs at Nanking." Since I left China I see that the Panchen Lama is on his way to Tibet, and no doubt the Nanking Government would like to extend their *opera bouffe* to Tibet. It is, of course, important to British interests in India that no amateur politicians be allowed to meddle with affairs in Tibet.

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## CHAPTER XV

### LOOTED TREASURES OF PEKING

IN a dispatch I sent from Peking to the *Daily Telegraph* in London, which was published under the heading "Looted Treasures of Peking," I said :

"Looting there has been in Peking, though neither hordes of disbanded soldiers nor Japanese conquerors have made entry. I think the greatest looters are the Nanking Government."

During my stay in Peking I have seen with my own eyes thousands of huge cases containing the wonderful collection of Imperial treasures in the Forbidden City being taken away to Shanghai. The Imperial and Forbidden Cities have been cleared of the accumulations of several hundreds of years.

No fewer than 3,500 huge boxes, filled with pottery, jades, inkstands, ritual vessels and

porcelains, were removed in two special trains from Peking to Shanghai. The collection removed is valued at £30,000,000.

Many of the articles thus taken from the Peking Museum vary in age from 2,000 to 3,000 years.

It is a well-known fact that during recent months there has been at Peking an unusually large number of German and American antique dealers, hovering about in the Forbidden City in the company of some of the Chinese high officials. Some of the most devoted friends and lovers of China fear that at least a portion of the cases which were sent to Shanghai may have gone even as far as the U.S.A. and Germany.

Some of my friends in Peking assure me that the removal of these priceless treasures from the old Imperial City is associated with thievery and corruption.

The romantic and mysterious Forbidden City, once the residence of the Imperial family, the princesses, the concubines and eunuchs, and last used as the quarters of the Emperor, who to-day

is ruler of Manchukuo, is now deserted, empty, and desolate, its streets filthy.

The granite sacrificial stones, upon which sacrifices used to be offered to the mountains and rivers of China, have disappeared. The Temple of Heaven itself has nothing left but its walls and roof. Yet, despite its emptiness, it is still the most beautiful edifice in the most wonderful city in the world. Formerly it was in this place that the Chinese Emperors offered their annual prayers for a happy and prosperous year.

It is still the most imposing and most sacred monument in China. Its altar fires witness to the prehistoric faith of China which preceded Buddhism and Confucianism.

It is generally believed by scholars and historians that the Temple of Heaven was always a distinctly Imperial shrine, the place appointed for Emperors' intercessions to the Great Ruler and grandfather of all the countless gods, demons and ghosts that have a place in the Chinese pantheon—intercessions on behalf of his children, the Chinese people."

The removal alone of the treasures cost the Peking authorities thirty thousand pounds, and since my dispatch was published (November 20th, 1933) I was assured that all the treasures are safe and that they are stored in the French Concession at Shanghai. In August, 1933, a special Commission, consisting of representatives of scientific institutions and Government officials, examined the cases which are there stored in a foreign warehouse. It was found that all was intact except furs, which had been affected by the damp. It was ascertained, however, that archives, books and paintings were showing signs of deterioration and that the damp climate of Shanghai would certainly destroy them altogether if left packed up in the warehouse. The Peking authorities demanded that the treasures be returned to that city, where the climate is dry and where they could be kept in proper cases. The Nanking Government, however, refused to return the treasures, under the plea that the newly-crowned Emperor of Manchukuo may one day return to his ancestors' palace and again take possession

LOOTED TREASURES OF PEKING 195  
of the Forbidden City. The cost of storage at Shanghai amounts to £1,000 a month, so that the cost of removal and storage has exhausted the Museum's endowment fund at Peking.

What is still more disturbing is the fact that it swallowed up all the funds which were used to keep in repair the palaces in the Forbidden City. Whatever repairs were done when I was in Peking were done at the expense of private persons, lovers of Chinese art. Thus Sir Miles Lampson, former British Minister at Peking, restored one of the buildings which were going to rack and ruin, in memory of Lady Lampson. Various cantons in China are now clamouring for the Peking treasures. They demand that the treasures be divided and placed in the various local museums, but all responsible foreign scholars are pleading with the Nanking Government to restore the treasures to Peking as the most suitable place.

A group of foreign Sinologists recently presented a memorandum to the Nanking Government,

pointing out that Peking still possesses the finest Chinese libraries and museums. Moreover, the signatories to the memorandum say that "to be able to combine the best examples of bronzes, paintings, ceramics, and calligraphy with the most magnificent examples of China's great architecture which is to be found in the palaces and courts of the Forbidden City, is an opportunity without parallel." In conclusion, the memorandum adds, "Finally, we should like to stress the importance of keeping the treasures and archives intact, particularly at this time, when their contents have not been fully catalogued nor carefully studied. To divide them up hastily among several centres would greatly decrease their usefulness and value for research purposes. The treasures and archives are essentially a unit from the scholar's point of view, and to destroy that unity would not only result in a great handicap to scholarship, but also retard deplorably the achievement of that ultimate purpose for which they are preserved—namely, to give mankind an intelligent appreciation

LOOTED TREASURES OF PEKING 197  
of China's artistic, intellectual and social achievements."

It is a pity that China has not a Lord Curzon to do for China what he has done for India.



## CHAPTER XVI

### THE JAPANESE ARMY

IN a former chapter I made allusion to the Japanese Army, particularly as to its behaviour towards the civilian population in their march to Jehol. As to its training, equipment and military technique this is not the place to write about it. There are works on the subject in abundance.\* Moreover, I am not a military expert, although I have written a book on "A Citizen's Army: the Swiss System." Everyone has heard or read about the Japanese soldier's patriotism, courage and bravery in face of danger, or his resignation to the inevitable in time of disaster, and above all, the Japanese soldier's determination to conquer.

What is true of the Japanese soldier also applies to the Japanese sailor. Both are devoted to their one master, the Emperor.

\* Captain M. D. Kennedy's study is a standard work.

While in Japan I came across an article in the *Japan Times*, reprinted from the London *Sunday Express*, giving such a succinct account of the Army in Manchuria that it made me ask an officer at the War Office in Tokio if a gentleman of the name of Gordon was with the Army during the campaign. He replied that no one of that name or a representative of that paper was with the Army. He agreed, however, that the article was so accurate that the writer must have obtained first-hand information. When I returned to London I called on Mr. Gordon, the editor of the *Sunday Express*, and after ascertaining the circumstances as to how he obtained the information, I asked his permission to include his article in my book. I give it without any alteration :

“ The Japanese Army is the greatest army in the world to-day.

It stands at the Gates of Peking, making terms with China, after one of the most remarkable military campaigns in the history of the world.

There has been nothing to equal it since the days when Jenghiz Khan marched from Mongolia to the Balkans and Alexander the Great from Greece into India.

At one stage in the sweep across Manchuria the Japanese Army moved forward twenty miles a day for thirteen consecutive days. On the last three days of the march through Jehol, Japanese brigades moved fifty miles each day through mountain passes in the teeth of blizzards. That is equal to the distance from London to Sheffield.

The army did not move along roads. There was only one main road. That road was monopolized by the motor transport. The rest of the army, including the infantry, marched across difficult, broken country. It moved, moreover, in the depths of winter in a region where winter is rigorous. The soldiers had to bivouac in the open without tents or camp fires, with the temperature many degrees below zero. They stuffed straw into their leggings to save their limbs from frostbite.

They accomplished the tremendous feat on a



ANCIENT JAPANESE ARMOUR



ration that would have broken any European army. Their chief food was boiled rice cooked in transport cookers as the army moved on. The rice was varied by occasional small issues of pickled fish, tinned meat and vegetables. Sometimes even rice was not available. Then the men had to be content with hard bread—far harder than an iron ration biscuit—made from corn and rice flour and eaten dry. No stimulants of any kind—not even tea or coffee—were given on the march. The Japanese Army quenches its thirst with plain water.

Scattered across the line of advance were two hundred thousand Chinese. Throughout the whole period of the advance they constantly menaced the Japanese flanks.

The Japanese Army which carried out this great military feat consisted of two divisions, with a picked infantry brigade and a cavalry brigade as an advance screen. What it did could probably be equalled by any other divisions in the Japanese Army.

The whole system of training in this modern

army is aimed at developing the fastest speed of movement and the greatest power of endurance by the individual soldier.

Practically all the soldiers are conscripts. They serve three years with the colours, and all infantry must be able at any time to march twenty miles a day in full kit for a prolonged period. They rest for fifteen minutes every two hours, compared with the British system of resting ten minutes every hour.

The kit of the Japanese Army is specially designed to aid speed of movement. The rifle weighs just  $6\frac{3}{4}$  pounds and is beautifully balanced in order that it shall be no burden to carry. Each soldier carries twenty-five per cent. less weight than the British soldier, the equipment and kit weighing just over twenty pounds. All feeding utensils are of aluminium.

The standing army of Japan is officially given as about two hundred and fifty thousand men, but at least another million trained men of military age are available at a moment's notice. As the nation numbers ninety millions, including

Formosa, Korea and the Caroline Islands, the reserve in the background is almost inexhaustible. Arms and complete equipment are in readiness for more than a million men.

Japan is upsetting many of the theories formed by European military experts during the Great War.

Her general staff do not agree that the days of cavalry are over. They believe that cavalry are still the eyes of the army and that aircraft cannot entirely fulfil this purpose.

The Japanese troop-horse is a smaller animal than that used by European cavalry. It is rather like a polo pony but more stocky, fairly speedy, capable of great endurance, and able to subsist on rough herbage and compressed fodder when better food is not obtainable.

Each cavalry unit carries a number of mounted machine-guns.

The Japanese believe strongly in mechanical transport, because it is speedier and because it is easier to feed a petrol engine than to feed a horse. They also make considerable use of armoured cars, but do not place much faith in



heavy tanks. They place little value on poison gas, regarding it as equally dangerous to friend and foe.

The pay of the Japanese soldier is 2d. a day. His dependants are looked after by the State while he is on service, and war veterans are always assured of employment on returning to civil life. To let an ex-service man starve would be regarded in Japan as a national disgrace.

What has all this to do with Britain? Simply this. If the League of Nations could, it would send us to war against Japan to-morrow. For all practical purposes Japan has withdrawn from the League. She is building a virile nation, and by her own strong arm making herself master of the East. And we—to please the United States—declined in 1921, on the eve of the Washington Conference, to renew our alliance with Japan.”

I may add that the Japanese Army, in its march to Jehol, consisted of only two divisions, the sixth and eighth, while Chinese opposed them with twenty-eight divisions.

Some of the soldiers, on their march from

Chinchow to Jehol, covered four hundred and eighty-eight kilometres in ten days, in spite of the fact that every mile is mountainous.

The cavalry brigade covered four hundred and eighty kilometres in seven days. The mounted troops wore heavier protective clothing against the cold, and high boots. Very few of the infantry had specially prepared clothing, so as to avoid weight, though they had heavy stockings.

The proportion of frost-bite casualties was twelve per cent., though few of these were bad. The medical services won high praise for their activities under arduous conditions.

Some of the men carried portable tents, but the chief protection was the shell of the village houses—the retreating Chinese having destroyed the roofs and all heating apparatus, perhaps an echo of Moscow and Napoleon.

Many of the transport men had only the covering of their vehicles at night. At times the cold was intense, sometimes dropping as low as twenty-four degrees below zero, and this was intensified by the terrible gales to thirty-six degrees.

Fortunately the weather was clear and fine throughout, except for a few days when snow-storms made visibility as little as a few feet. Every soldier was provided with snow goggles, felt-framed.

Food at times was scarce. Each soldier got about sixpence for rations. Nearly all the fodder for the horses was sent from Japan.

For transport, motor and horse vehicles were provided in abundance. From my aeroplane I saw a wonderful system of convoy like two streams in, either direction, and numbering thousands of carts of every description. Every few miles was a depot, for repairs and petrol and supplies, marked by a Japanese flag. In the mountains or places of special difficulty pack-horses and aeroplanes were used.

I would caution foreign countries against loose talk regarding the weak resistance shown by the Chinese troops. Ineffective it may have proved, but stubbornly contested actions were by no means unusual. Along the Great Wall the Chinese did not spare themselves, and fought like demons. I



THE GREAT WALL OF CHINA



should hesitate to give even an estimate of local casualties, but the number of corpses I saw was appalling. Bombing from planes accounted for a large proportion. Also, I myself saw a terrible slope where hundreds of Chinese dead lay frozen, with their rifles in their hands.

An impression of the moral effect of the bombing came to me as I flew over certain passes on the southern side of the Wall, and a few days before the armistice, in the direction of Peking. My plane was, of course, not a bomber, and indeed was a light Moth. In one valley, as we roared overhead, flocks of sheep scattered at the sound of our engine. Only a few minutes later, in another pass, we came upon retreating Chinese troops. From overhead, the effect of scattering and aimless rushing for safety of a thousand men resembled pathetically the panic of the sheep.

The ingenious uses to which straw was put interested me. While in Japan I had noticed the picturesque straw capes worn by many a peasant during heavy rain while splashing about at work in the rice fields. In Manchuria I saw

longer capes of straw worn by many of the soldiers, and especially by the wireless units. The wireless corps protected its forward instruments within straw huts, which were carried on the march and set up with wire when a post was established. These huts were almost hermetically sealed when the straw door was secured, also by pliable wire. I slept one night in such a hut, and notwithstanding the strong wind outside I found the interior weather-tight and water-tight.

Bad casualties were transported to the nearest hospital largely by aeroplane. I saw as many as five stretcher cases in one plane. I often wondered at and admired the endurance shown by bad cases while waiting to be fetched.

Naturally, there were no aerodromes prepared in advance, but I have seen as many as forty bombers drawn up on an ordinary field outside the walled city of Miyun, while at Jehol the aerodrome was a stretch of soil levelled by the receding winter floods. Men were constantly at work raking and improving this landing ground.

Campaign conditions, especially in great cold

and among mountains, are surely the best test of an air service. My own observations impel me to contradict the assertions made by too many people that the Japanese flying service is deficient. During all the time I was with the army, and, because I was flying, in touch with air-fields, there was no single bomber lost, and there came to my knowledge only one loss of an observer plane. This one made a forced landing in a mountain pass, where bandits surrounded it, murdered the pilot, set the plane on fire and carried off the observer as a hostage. It was on May 24th that this happened, and by chance my pilot, instructed to keep a look-out for this plane, spotted it. We saw the smoke from the plane, but of course we could do nothing, and I heard the story later.



## CHAPTER XVII

### JEHOL


JEHOL has been known as the City of Emperors, because of its being the summer residence of the Manchu rulers, but it has also hitherto had the unsavoury reputation of being the stronghold of the opium traffic. In fact, in recent years Jehol was a lost province, as it was difficult to keep in touch with it on account of its being in the hands of the War Lords and infested by bandits. The City of Jehol must at one time have possessed a barbaric magnificence. The temples and palaces have, however, been neglected for years, though they are still a wonderful testimony of China's past grandeur.

The Japanese, when they arrived in Jehol in 1933, wasted no time, but immediately began the work of restoring these temples and palaces, and

it is hoped that these glorious monumental relics of antiquity will now be preserved. The temples are erected on the hills surrounding the city, and have the appearance of fortifications. They belong to the three sects, Buddhists, Confucians, and Lamas. Graveyards surround the temples, the reason for this being that the various tribes of Mongols and others have always had a superstition against marching over graves at night, and consequently the Emperors could feel safe in their beds when spending the summer in the Jehol palace. There is said to have been as many as two thousand monks residing in the various temples, and they also acted as a body-guard to the Emperor within the city.

The palace of Jehol with its park is surrounded by a six-mile wall, sixteen feet high and sixteen feet thick. The British missionary, who has been living there for a quarter of a century, had never been permitted to enter until May, 1933, when he and his wife and another missionary accompanied me within the precincts. The park is magnificent, with beautiful lakes abounding in

fish. In one of the lakes there is an artificial island reached by flat stepping-stones. Here and there one sees a herd of deer. There must at one time have been a sort of road running the six miles round the park close to the wall inside, but it was only possible to go by car for a distance of two miles, as the stone bridges were broken down. A fine pagoda within the park was visible from the surrounding wall and close to it two huge buildings surrounded by a second wall, which were factories for the manufacture of opium, heroin and other narcotic drugs. In the time of the War Lords, before the Japanese entered Jehol, a German professor was engaged at these factories to superintend the drug manufacture. Agents, Japanese, Chinese, Koreans and others, used to transport the drugs to Tientsing and other ports of China, whence they were distributed throughout the country. It is estimated that the War Lords made something like one hundred million Mexican dollars annually out of this nefarious trade. I was told that ninety million dollars were divided among the War Lords



SUMMER PALACE OF CHENGDEH, JEHOL



of Manchuria, the other ten million being spent on propaganda in the United States and Europe to put a stop to the manufacture and sending of opium to China, so that the War Lords might be free from competition. This money for propaganda purposes is said to have been sent anonymously to societies in various countries whose purpose is to support the League of Nations in its task of suppressing the import of opium and other dangerous drugs to China.


When I visited the two factories with my missionary friends, we found a scene of wreck and ruin, everything being smashed and destroyed except the big vats, which still smelt of opium, even the copper pipes having been torn away by the people of Jehol.

Two days before the entry of the Japanese army into Jehol, the War Lord, Tan Yu Ling, who only a few weeks previously, together with the young Marshal, Chang Hsin Liang, had taken an oath at the palace in the presence of Mr. T. V. Soong, that they would defend the Jehol province to their last drop of blood and

their last grain of rice, cleared out without firing a shot. The War Lord, however, had taken care to provide himself with motor lorries, sent to him from Peking, and these he filled with sacks of silver dollars and boxes of opium. In other vans he placed his wives and concubines, and then, preceded by a vanguard of troops, he followed on horseback with the remainder of his soldiers and thus left the province of Jehol.

The moment he turned his back on the city the populace rushed to the palace and literally looted the place. In the words of one of the missionaries, who was an eyewitness: "For a whole day there was a regular procession of people from the palace carrying off every conceivable article, whatever they could lay their hands on."

As I have already said, they broke up the opium factories, leaving little but the walls and roof, and had the Japanese army not arrived the following day, they would even have cut down the trees in the park. After the departure of the War Lord, until the Japanese army arrived, there was neither police nor military to keep order.



CLOSE TO THE PAGODA WERE THE TWO OPIUM FACTORIES DESTROYED BY THE PEOPLE OF JI-HOI  
AFTER THE WAR LORD HAD LEFT





I could not describe in a single chapter the magnificence of the temples already referred to, even though, when I visited them, they were in such a state of neglect that in walking through them we had to be on the look-out to avoid falling tiles and stones. Between the stones of the stairways leading up to the temples there were growing weeds and shrubs, rendering access somewhat difficult. It was, in fact, a scene of splendid desolation, surpassing even the neglected magnificence of the Summer and Winter Palaces in Peking.

In the old days of the War Lords, when the opium factories of Jehol were in full prosperity, the people were compelled to grow poppies to supply the raw material. They were paid in paper money issued by the War Lord himself.

They were prevented from growing grain or other foodstuffs more than just sufficient for their own needs.

Now the Japanese have made opium a Government monopoly, and only with a doctor's certificate can opium or any other dangerous drug be

purchased. Yet I regret to find that anti-Japanese propaganda is still libelling that Government by spreading reports that it is encouraging the cultivation of the poppy for opium production. As recently as October, 1933, I received from one of those Anti-Opium Bureaux a circular saying :

“ The recent development of poppy culture in ‘ Manchukuo ’ at the urge of the Japanese, who are reported to have dropped leaflets from aeroplanes inciting the peasants in ‘ Manchukuo ’ to sow opium poppy, is reported to have resulted in doubling the opium production there. The whole policy in Manchuria and ‘ Manchukuo ’ appears to be one of increasing as much as possible the production of opium. This can only lead to the consumption of such opium by the Chinese population, which will be weakened and impoverished, and to the manufacture of morphine and heroin to supply the clandestine traffic of the world. ‘ Manchukuo’s ’ attitude may best be gauged from

the fact that ' Manchukuo ' coins bear upon them the design of a poppy plant in full bloom ! ”

Such a libellous statement against the Japanese nation could not have been issued except with deliberate and malicious forethought. To begin with, the Jehol people do not require leaflets thrown from aeroplanes to incite them to grow the poppy. Secondly, no evidence is given by this anti-opium association that such a thing really took place, and as for the coins bearing the design of the poppy plant in full bloom being illustrative of the attitude of the Manchukuo Government as regards the production of opium, one might as well conclude that “ Poppy Day ” in the British Empire is an encouragement to the opium smoker ! As a matter of fact, the poppy is the common flower of the country, growing everywhere, hence its choice as a symbol on the coins of the new State of Manchukuo.

The Japanese, who freed Jehol from the tyranny of the War Lords, have made a deep impression

upon the population. Already in May, 1933, when I was there, an air of growing prosperity was perceptible, there was bustle and activity and the people appeared to be on the friendliest terms with the Japanese officials. Accustomed as they had been to looting by uniformed men, the inhabitants were amazed at the fact that the Japanese soldiers paid in full for whatever they wanted. The people are now becoming accustomed to the new system of law and order and to having a police force among whom "squeezing" or "graft" does not exist. Moreover, they see their city being cleansed, schools being built and the old abuses abolished. In fact, Chinese from Peking and from beyond the Wall are now flocking to the Province of Jehol. Taxes are down, and there was a real air of cheer among the people in the city of Jehol and the surrounding country. I saw the beginnings of roads and railways under the direction of the Japanese and the gradual opening up of the country so that the farmers may bring their produce to the towns for sale.

While I travelled about the Province of Jehol, through the region south of the Kupeikon Pass, along the Great Wall, I was struck by the handling of dead Chinese soldiers by the Japanese victors. The Japanese army not only buried the dead bodies in large graveyards, but each graveyard had a stone monument inscribed with a dedication to "the brave soldiers of the Chinese army." When I was in Jehol, it was still the habit of the people to leave their dead children, especially girls, lying in the streets to be eaten by vagrant dogs. The Japanese authorities informed me that they are going to put a stop to this barbarous custom.

Perhaps the most highly appreciated action performed by the Japanese in the Jehol province, and for that matter throughout Manchukuo, was that they not only stabilized the money, but also redeemed the paper money issued by the former War Lords.

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At this point it might be well to say a word or two about the position of the Mongols *vis-à-vis*

Manchukuo. It should never be forgotten that there is a great affinity between the two chief races of the North, the Mongols and the Manchus. When three centuries ago the Manchus were at war with the Chinese, in the struggle which ended in the establishment of the great Manchu dynasty at Peking, the Mongols were the allies of the Manchus and were correspondingly rewarded when the Manchu princes ascended the imperial throne of China.

From every point of view the Mongol is more allied to the Manchu than to the Chinese. In principle, the Mongol is a keeper of flocks and the Chinese a tiller of the soil. Between such races there can be no real affinity, for throughout the centuries the herdsmen of the North have swept south into China just as the Chinese have invaded Mongolia and Manchuria whenever they felt strong enough to do so. It is a significant point that in 1740 the Manchu dynasty prohibited Chinese immigration into Mongolia and Manchuria, a prohibition which lasted for about one hundred and sixty years. There was, of course, already

a large number of Chinese in Manchuria, the relics of former invasions of Manchuria by the Tang and Ming dynasties. The Manchu dynasty remained firm in its policy of preventing such immigration, until at the beginning of the twentieth century it was compelled to raise the ban in order to counteract the increasing immigration of Russians from the North.

The general result of this inflow of population has been that there is a Chinese numerical majority in Manchuria, and the Manchus have, to some extent, assimilated themselves to Chinese customs. The Mongolians, on the other hand, are strongly anti-Chinese. A well known authority on the subject has stated that the Mongols "are resigned to almost any amount of Japanese control if only they are guaranteed against Chinese colonization."

The number of Mongols in Manchuria is about two million. Of this total half a million is in Jehol and the remainder for the most part in Barga Province.

Jehol has an area of 60,550 square miles with a



population consisting roughly of 3,600,000 Chinese and 500,000 Mongols. Jehol city has the most intimate connection with the Manchu dynasty, and it is therefore scarcely to be wondered at that the new Emperor, on returning to his ancestral home in Manchuria, should have Jehol within his jurisdiction.

Indeed, there can be no doubt that Jehol belongs to Manchuria from every argument of law, history and tradition. One has only to remember that it lies north of the Great Wall to call to mind the perpetual severance between north and south. The majority of the Mongols in Jehol have preserved the Mongolian language and intermarried with the Chinese but rarely. Indeed, so great is the antipathy between the two races that the nomad Mongols look down on their Jehol brethren as unworthy of the traditions of the race.

From the very outset of the negotiations for the establishment of the new State of Manchukuo, the Mongols were represented in the discussions. The incorporation of Jehol by Manchukuo was

not an after-thought of the Japanese authorities, but an integral part of the plan for the formation of the new State. This could not but be so, because Jehol in the hands of Manchukuo is an essential prerequisite of any peace or stability for the new State. Any other disposition of Jehol would afford a base north of the Great Wall for unlimited Chinese guerrilla warfare against Manchukuo.

The Mongols of Barga, though uncompromisingly anti-Chinese, have maintained more independence of spirit and tradition and have indeed been more successful in resisting the Chinese War Lords than their fellow Mongols in other provinces of Manchuria. A curious manifestation of the Barga Mongols' attitude is their hostility to any railway construction, since they think the building of a railway signifies Chinese immigration and the victory of the plough over pasture land. This is a real problem confronting the new Government if it is to retain the loyalty of the Barga Mongols, a problem which will need all the statesmanship of the new Government and its Japanese advisers.

The interests of the Barga Mongols cannot be allowed to prevail over those of the overwhelming majority of the population, but there is room for an equitable adjustment of their needs to the requirements of the country as a whole, and for a conciliatory treatment of the minority.

## CHAPTER XVIII


### WILL MANCHUKUO EVER BE RECOGNIZED?

“RECOGNITION” of a country is, under modern conditions, a phrase full of pitfalls. For many years in English history it might be said that the Kings of England refused to acknowledge the claims of the royal house of France, since they styled themselves Kings of France long after the medieval wars, to which the claim had given rise, had become a thing of the past, while the Valois and Bourbons continued to rule France and be recognized by the world at large, including, in practice, England. The Pope of the day excommunicated and refused to acknowledge the existence of Elizabeth Tudor, yet Elizabeth Tudor continued to rule England with no small measure of efficiency and power. One might carry the absurdity further and recall

the fact that many of the Powers of Europe refused to acknowledge Napoleon Bonaparte. Indeed, it is not to the credit of our own country that after Waterloo we refused to allow him any title but that of General Bonaparte.

To come to more modern times, the kingdom of Serbia (now part of Yugoslavia) was refused "recognition" by the Government of Great Britain for nearly four years after the murder of King Alexander and the Consort in 1903.

Such instances could be multiplied from history, but it is difficult to determine whether at any given moment "non-recognition" has any practical or vital effect. If one turns to political theory, it is difficult to see what effect upon, say, the United States, would be produced by the non-recognition of the United States by Mexico or Nicaragua. It would be fairly safe to assume that the consequences, if any, would be deleterious for Mexico or Nicaragua. Turning back to political practice, can it be seriously alleged that the non-recognition of Soviet Russia which, though not complete is still considerable, had had any



FOREIGN OFFICE, HSINKING, FORMERLY CALLED CHANGCHUN



really deleterious effect upon the development of the U.S.S.R.? Is not the admittedly precarious state of the Russian experiment due mainly to the inherent difficulty of setting up a Communist state in a "Capitalist" world, and not to any question of "recognition" or "non-recognition," as such? Many states which have recognized Soviet Russia have done little or no trade with her, and their relations with her have been almost persistently unfriendly. Other states which have not recognized, or which for many years did not recognize Russia, maintain closer trade relations with her than the recognizing states. It would not appear, therefore, that the question of "recognition" or "non-recognition" is of primary importance in the development of a state or in the continuation of its existence.

The idea intrudes itself that what really matters is the health and stability of the State itself, in a word, its "power"—meaning, of course, not power for aggression against other states, but its power of maintaining a separate existence. An index of this would be the "power" of the



various nations of the world to withstand orders addressed to them by the other Powers through the medium of the League of Nations. Thus Greece and Bulgaria were forced to submit to the Council of the League, whereas, in the famous Corfu incident, Italy declined to yield and only yielded later to the representations of the Great Powers. This fact may be accepted with enthusiasm or dismay according to the international political views of the reader, but it is a fact none the less.

What then is the case as regards Manchukuo? Put in a nutshell, it is that the United States is giving a lead to the other nations, big and small, to refuse to recognize the new State. The question would seem, therefore, to be, what "power" does Manchukuo possess to maintain her status, against "non-recognition"?

Her power would seem to be considerable. She has an area of 448,957 square miles, with a population of thirty-two millions. The budget already nearly balances and she has a favourable trade balance. Moreover, she has Japan behind her.

As someone remarked, "the Powers may not recognize her, but they cannot ignore her and they certainly do not . . . She is too big and potentially too rich to be ignored."

It was in March, 1932, that the Foreign Minister of Manchukuo advised the Powers of the constitution of the new State. It is interesting to note the principles laid down in the message from Manchukuo concerning the guiding principles of the new State, as follows :

(1) that the Government will conduct the affairs of the State according to the primary principle of faith and confidence, and the spirit of harmony and friendship, and pledge itself to maintain and promote international peace ;

(2) that the Government will respect international justice in accordance with international laws and conventions ;

(3) that the Government will accede to the obligations of the Republic of China by virtue of treaty stipulations with foreign

countries, in the light of international laws and conventions, and that these obligations shall be faithfully discharged ;

(4) that the Government will not infringe upon the acquired rights of the peoples of foreign countries within the limits of the State of Manchuria, and, further, that their persons and properties shall be given full protection ;

(5) that the Government will welcome the inflow of the nationals of foreign countries and their residence in Manchuria, and that all races shall be accorded equitable treatment ;

(6) that trade and commerce with foreign countries shall be facilitated so as to contribute to the development of world economy ;

(7) that with regard to the economic activities of peoples of foreign nations within the State of Manchuria, the principle of the Open Door shall be observed.

As a matter of fact, not even Japan at once recognized Manchukuo. There would seem to

have been a certain division of opinion at Tokio about the advisability of so doing. Tokio was well aware that the League of Nations had appointed the Lytton Commission and that Japan had agreed to the appointment of that Commission, which was at the time on its way to China. It was, therefore, deemed inadvisable and impolitic for Japan to recognize Manchukuo at the outset. There always remained the hope that the Commission's report might absolve Japan in the eyes of the League and that then Japan could recognize Manchukuo with a better grace. The Commission's Report, however, did not fulfil these hopes. It accused Japan, on what Japan considered insufficient evidence, of setting up a "puppet" state in Manchukuo, and, by implication, of aiming at the annexation of Manchuria. For a people like the Japanese there was only one response, namely, the recognition of Manchukuo.

It may not be generally known that during the period from March 12th to September 15th, 1932, on which latter date Japan recognized

Manchukuo, the Government of Manchukuo had on more than one occasion strongly urged Tokio to take immediate steps towards recognition. This shows that the delay was due solely to the precautions of the Japanese Government.

Eventually, on September 15th, 1932, Japan recognized Manchukuo. Salvador has also recently done so.

But there has been another nation which has shown itself friendly to Manchukuo. I refer to Soviet Russia. From the outset of the inauguration of the new regime in Manchuria, the Soviet authorities on the spot co-operated heartily with the new authorities of Manchukuo, and did everything possible to ensure Russian neutrality in any possible conflict between Manchukuo and the Chinese War Lords. Manchukuo Consulates were established at Vladivostok and various other centres in Eastern Siberia ; but the greatest mark of Soviet friendliness was Russia's agreement to hand over to Manchukuo fifty per cent. of the profits of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which, in accordance with Treaty agreements, is under the

joint ownership of China and Soviet Russia. Soviet Russia has thus repudiated China's authority over the railway and substituted for it that of Manchukuo. All these actions amount to *de facto* recognition, although no official intimation of recognition by Soviet Russia has as yet been conveyed to the Manchukuo authorities.

The fact is that neither Soviet Russia nor Japan wishes to come to blows unless for some imperative reason which has not yet arisen. It is clear that Soviet Russia does not regard the formation of Manchukuo as anything approaching a *casus belli*, while Japan, on her side, is equally anxious, as I have stated in another chapter, to avoid a conflict with her powerful neighbour, with the extent of whose resources she is perfectly well acquainted. Facts like these should dispel mischevous propaganda on either side concerning immediate war between "Capitalist" Japan and Communist Russia. The ardent Communist rallies to the cause of China because, he says, Japan is annexing Manchukuo as a preliminary to an attack on Communist Russia. A section of the British

press cries "Hands off Japan," because they say she is our natural bulwark against Communism—in other words, Japan will pull the Communist chestnuts out of the fire for the "Capitalists" of the Occident! Both are wrong.

Both sides are completely mistaken. Indeed, I find it difficult to determine which is the sillier—the view of the *ex parte* Communist or the view of the penny-grabbing press baron. Neither of them make sense. If there is one thing clear to anyone who has been upon the spot and studied conditions now obtaining, it is that Japan and Soviet Russia have no intention whatsoever of going to war, least of all over Manchukuo. Soviet Russia infinitely prefers Manchukuo as a substitute for the anarchy and maladministration of the Chinese War Lords. Indeed, one might even go as far as to say that the present attitude both of the Japanese Government and of the Government of Soviet Russia in regard to Manchukuo constitutes one of the few examples afforded us of the possibility of a "Capitalist" State working

in practical amity with the Communist State in a case where large issues are at stake. Without entering into any discussion of various rumours concerning a Soviet-Japanese pact of non-aggression, it can safely be stated that the two Governments are prepared to respect each other's sovereign rights and to work in realistic collaboration.

If I might offer a personal view, it is that Japan would be well advised to consider Russian offers of friendship and collaboration in the Far East. No considerations such as a chimerical fear of "red propaganda" should be allowed to stand in the way of *de facto* collaboration between two great Powers on a question of outstanding importance for Oriental and world economy. Clearly, so long as a State of one hundred and seventy million people is practising Communism in an otherwise Capitalist world, there will be propaganda for and against the respective economic systems. Speaking as a convinced Capitalist, I am bound to admit that there is at least as much anti-Communist propaganda in



the world as anti-Capitalist, and such considerations should not, as I say, prevent the solution of an urgent problem of civilization and order by agreement between two powerful Governments. I do not think such agreement can fail to be reached in the long run, but the sooner it is reached the better.

Here we have then the answer to the question, will Manchukuo be recognized ?

(1) It is unknown whether Manchukuo will or will not be recognized.

(2) It will not matter very much whether or not Manchukuo is recognized so long as Japan and Soviet Russia can maintain and consolidate their agreement for the protection of the new State, the development of its immediate relationships and the preservation of peace and order in the surrounding territories. With such backing, with its natural riches and the industrious habits of its population, Manchukuo does not need the formal "recognition" of any State whatsoever. I would hazard a guess that whatever may be the diplomatic attitude of the Governments, the

nationals of many great countries are already casting eyes upon the possibilities of commerce and manufacture contained in the state which is now to be known as Manchukuo. Will they have any chance to trade and carry on business operations there? If the proclamation of the Manchukuo Government and the observations on this subject by Japan are to be given any credence, the answer is in the affirmative. The Open Door is guaranteed in Manchukuo. It remains to be seen if it will be applied in practice. The Open Door does not mean, of course, that the inhabitants of Manchukuo should be compelled to purchase European products in preference to Manchurian, Chinese, Japanese or Russian. If a Manchurian can obtain some supplies in a local market or from Japan, it is no violation of the principle if he prefers such products to goods imported from Europe or the United States of America. I stress this point because there are some who seem to interpret the principle of the Open Door in the Far East as a kind of compulsion upon the inhabitants of China and Manchuria

to "buy British" or "buy American." No sane economist could possibly adopt such a view. Of course what the principle of the Open Door means is that there should be fair trading opportunities for all nations, under the recognized rules of Capitalist competition, within the State of Manchukuo. This principle Manchukuo herself has enunciated, and Japan has seconded Manchukuo in statements which are fairly unambiguous. Do not forget that in 1904-5 Japan fought single-handed against Imperialist Russia for the principle of the Open Door in Manchuria. What, I wonder, would have become of freedom of trade and equality of opportunity in Manchuria and even in the northern provinces of China, had Imperial Russia been allowed complete dominion over Manchuria or even over Peking. Japan pulled our chestnuts out of the fire for us in 1904, and we stood by and let her do it. From one point of view it might be argued that she is doing no less now in countenancing and encouraging the establishment of a free and orderly State, the riches of which can

be developed in the interests of general prosperity.

It is possible, even more than possible, that in the future, perhaps the near future, various States may decide that it is in the interests of their nationals to recognize Manchukuo. Such recognition will be pure gain for Manchukuo and for all concerned, and will tend to the extension of those friendly relations under which alone trade can really prosper. But make no mistake. The friendly relations already exist. They can only be further developed by recognition, they cannot be created, because, as I have said, they exist already. Whatever the future may hold in store, Manchukuo is a *de facto* entity which no amount of *de facto* recognition can help either to create or to destroy. The future is in the hands of the people of Manchukuo, and, as the collaboration of Manchukuo's two great neighbours would seem to be assured, the outlook is far from being without promise either for Manchukuo or for the rest of the world.

Fine phrases apart, and despite a hastily

announced Stimson doctrine of non-recognition (which, if adhered to, might hoist the U.S.A. with her own petard), already in 1933 I have seen American citizens eagerly apply for visas from the Manchukuo Consuls at Dairen and other places.

## CHAPTER XIX

### THE GATEWAY OF THE EAST

CERTAIN scaremongers have recently been spreading reports that the Japanese, portray anxiety regarding the Singapore basin. It was reported that as a result (or consequence) of so much strength being concentrated in the East, Japan is entitled to review her armaments as compared to Great Britain. It is quite possible that some insignificant paper in Japan controlled by Indians may have published something about the Singapore base by using the subject for anti-British propaganda. It must be remembered that Indian agitators who are wanted by the Indian police for political murders and other crimes generally managed to escape to Japan, where they have an organized propaganda and never miss an opportunity of spreading all sorts of lies against Great Britain. These creatures, however,

have very little influence in Japan, except one or two who became naturalized, married Japanese wives, and are out-Heroding Herod in their "patriotism."

The thoughtful Japanese are not much impressed by them. An example of what the Japanese think of these patriots is well illustrated in a description of them given by a diplomat in the presence of a company of a distinguished gathering of Japanese. This diplomat said he never understood Dr. Johnson's definition "that the last refuge of a scoundrel is patriotism." While at Bombay he saw a pickpocket snatch a purse from an old man. A policeman gave chase after the thief and caught him. A big crowd gathered, whereupon the pickpocket began to call out "Long live Gandhi." The mob immediately released the thief. "Now (said this diplomat), you have the illustration of the last refuge of scoundrels."

During my stay in Tokio I had occasion to discuss the Singapore basin with statesmen and others. One evening Lord Clive and I were

entertained by officers of the Japanese Navy and the subject of Singapore came up. They admitted that Great Britain holds the gate of the Far East, but that did not imply that the gate is only against Japan. In fact, as one of the officers remarked, Great Britain's position is that of an impartial policeman. As there is at present a good deal of interest in Singapore, it may not be out of place to give a brief history of the place and how it came about that we got possession. I could not do better than reproduce an article which I dictated for the *Sunday Express* of April 8th, 1934.

One hundred and twenty years ago a man thirty years of age was Lieutenant-Governor of Java and our priceless possessions in the Malay Straits.

He had seen the strategical value of the peninsula, and almost single-handed had made it British.

Then, with traditional stupidity, our Government under Castlereagh and Canning traded, sold, and gave away all that we possessed there—the Gateway to the East.



The young man, Stamford Raffles, seeing his dream shattered and Britain cheated of her strength, protested violently. He was banished.

Five years later the Government saw its awful mistake. It realized that it had given away our only trade or sea-power base in the most vital area of the East.

Raffles was recalled. He was asked to use his unrivalled knowledge to find Britain a foothold in the Malay Straits. Like a hound unleashed he dashed off to Singapore.

He had hardly gone when the vacillating powers at home sent a letter recalling him.

It would have been easier to recall the wind.

Six weeks after starting out to rebuild his shattered dream Stamford Raffles had planted the Union Jack at Singapore with his own hands.

He negotiated a treaty with the Sultan of Johore, and on the same day drew up a Constitution which remains the governmental code to-day.

The Dutch, who had found the British Government so easy to deal with so far, were furious. But Raffles stuck to his small foothold.

The India Office and the Foreign Office were almost as angry as the Dutch. Still Raffles clung on to the little settlement which he knew was the only key to the gateway between the East and the West.

He knew that if he could hold on to Singapore he had secured for Britain something which in the future would prove infinitely more valuable than Gibraltar or Malta.

"It is the child of my own heart," he wrote at that time. "If no untimely fate awaits, it will become our Emporium and Pride of the East."

To-day Singapore is all that Raffles hoped for it. It is probably our most vital possession.

Yet this is so by good luck rather than good guidance. Even within the last few years Governments have muddled and wasted time and money playing with this priceless heritage.

Let me explain to you why Singapore is so valuable. It is the only passage through a wall of rock which separates the Pacific Ocean from the Indian Ocean.

Traffic between the two oceans must pass

through Singapore. There is no other route. It is to-day the most impregnable barrier on the waters of the world.

I have seen it, and have been amazed by it. It is fascinating.


You know that you are viewing the greatest fortification on earth. Yet it is all covered with a majestic beauty. The harbour is lovelier than that of Rio, of Sydney, or of Hongkong.

That harbour is absolutely land-locked. Eight hundred feet of solid rock protects its huge and secret armament from any form of attack which man has yet devised.

As though further protection were necessary, nature has provided a treacherous and dangerous current in the entrance to the harbour. No ship can pass through the channel without a pilot.

Only British-born pilots board the thousands of ships which pass through. Their knowledge of the currents and of the basins about the islands at the entrance is knowledge jealously guarded.

It is perfect, so perfect that the smallest force



SIR STAMFORD RAFFLES



could hold it indefinitely against the most powerful sea force in the world.

Its food supplies come from New Zealand and Australia. No power on earth could interfere with those food supplies, and the countries from which they come need fear no aggression from the over-populated Eastern nations while the flag which Raffles planted still flies above the base at Singapore.

Above all this natural protection has been built one of the finest aerodromes in the world. It is 1,000 yards in diameter and the heaviest machines can rise in the wind from any point of the compass. Around the aerodrome is a protective belt 300 yards deep. It is so perfectly situated that both seaplanes and landplanes can come to rest on it. It cost £1,000,000 to build. That cost was borne by the municipality.

The aerodrome is as much the junction airport of the East as is the harbour the junction for shipping.

At Singapore and on the islands dotted about the coast are the immense stores of oil fuel for

ships and airplanes. Here is the only place, for instance, where Japanese ships of war could refuel if they went on aggressive errands towards Honolulu.

They could reach their objective without refuelling, but they would have to fill up again before they could return. Singapore commands the supplies they would have to call on.

Yet the Japanese are favourably disposed towards Singapore. To whatever extent it might hamper them in attacking it protects them in the same measure from attack.

It is unnecessary to stress descriptions of the armament about this great naval base. It is obviously as perfect as modern science can invent.

Raffles discovered this unique key to the East under the noses of the Dutch. He had to fight his own Government to retain it for us. He hurried his own death by the efforts that fight entailed.

There is a statue in Westminster Abbey, within a stone's throw of the Parliament in which he was cursed for being a hot-headed young fool, in memory of his far-seeing genius.

On its plinth are inscribed the following beautiful words :

To the memory of :  
SIR THOMAS STAMFORD RAFFLES,  
Lieut.-Governor of Java,  
And First President of the  
Zoological Society of London.  
Born 1781, died 1826.

Selected at an early age to conduct the government of the British conquests in the Indian Ocean, by wisdom, vigour and philanthropy he raised Java to happiness and prosperity unknown under former rulers.

After the surrender of that Island to the Dutch and during his government in Sumatra he founded an emporium at Singapore, where, in establishing freedom of person as the right of the soil and freedom of trade as the right of the port, he secured to the British flag the maritime superiority of the Eastern seas.

Ardently attached to science, he laboured successfully to add to the knowledge and enrich the museums of his native land ; promoting the welfare of the people committed to his care, he sought the good of his country and the glory of God.

Britain may well cherish the memory of Raffles.





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